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Chapter 9

CANADA
Robert J. Currie and Steve Coughlan. (The authors thank Alex Gorlewski,
J.D. Dalhousie 2013 (expected) for his excellent research assistance.)

INTRODUCTION: THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE
9.01 This chapter will briefly survey the state of the law regarding the
gathering, discovery and admissibility of electronic evidence in Canada. As a
general comment, Canada is a comparatively wealthy and technologicallydeveloped Western country, and in terms of the creation and use of electronic
data it is probably abreast of most other OECD member states. Perhaps
because of its relatively small population (approximately 34.1m), the amount
of litigation is much smaller compared to other countries, particularly the
United States. As a result, while both the legislatures and the common law are
grappling with the new legal frontiers created by the need to deal with
electronic evidence, the law is more well-developed in some areas than in
others.
9.02 An important feature that should be noted for the foreign reader is
Canada’s jurisdictional structure, which is much more segmented than some1.
Canada is a federal state, and the Constitution divides jurisdiction over
legislative matters between the ‘federal’ or central government and the
governments of the ten provinces and three territories. There is therefore a
regulatory jurisdiction inherent in each level of government. The most
important distinction for present purposes is that the federal government has
jurisdiction over the criminal law, while jurisdiction over civil and property
matters rests with the provinces and territories. Canada is a constitutional
monarchy and member of the Commonwealth; the monarch of England is
formally the head of state for Canada, and both the federal and provincial
governments are each often referred to as the Crown.
1

An authoritative general resource on Canadian constitutional law is Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf edn (1992), Carswell.

9.03 Each province has a court structure that can be roughly broken into
inferior, superior and appellate courts. All three levels of court can administer
both federal and provincial or territorial law. Operating parallel to the
provincial superior courts is the Federal Court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the provincial superior courts in civil cases where the Federal
Crown is a litigant, and also has jurisdiction over cases in some specialised
areas within federal legislative jurisdiction (tax, admiralty, immigration,
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9.03 Canada
intellectual property)1. Appeals from both the provincial appellate courts and
the Federal Court of Appeal are heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, which
is the highest appellate court.
1

There are also federally and provincially-constituted administrative tribunals, appeals from
which generally go to the Federal Court or Court of Appeal, or the provincial appellate courts,
respectively.

9.04 As in most common law jurisdictions1, Canadian evidence law2 emerges
primarily from the common law. The common law of evidence does not vary
between jurisdictions, so each court will apply essentially the same evidence
law regardless of whether it is hearing a case based in federal or provincial
competence. However, the common law is modified and supplemented by
evidence statutes in each jurisdiction, each of which modifies the law of
evidence within that legislative realm. Criminal and federal regulatory matters
come under the Canada Evidence Act3, while each of the provinces and
territories has its own evidence statute4.
1

2

3
4

The province of Québec is primarily a ‘civil law’ (in the European sense) jurisdiction, and areas
of provincial legislative competence come under this civil law regime. Book VII of the
Civil Code of Quebec functions as that province’s equivalent to the other provincial evidence
statutes. Most matters peculiar to Québec law will not be given specific attention in this
chapter.
The standard reference works on Canadian evidence law are David M. Paciocco and
Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (6th edn, 2011), Irwin Law; and Alan W. Bryant, Sidney
N. Lederman and Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada (3rd edn, 2009),
Butterworths. On this specific topic see Alan Gahtan, Electronic Evidence (1999), Carswell.
Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c. C-5.
For instance, Nova Scotia Evidence Act, RSNS 1989, c. 154; Ontario Evidence Act, RSO
1990, c. E.23.

9.05 The interrelation of law and jurisdiction can be confusing. For clarity, the
following may be helpful: in the province of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court
of Nova Scotia is the province’s superior court. On Monday it might hear a
criminal murder trial, in which it would apply the criminal law (federal, under
the Criminal Code of Canada1), and in which it would adhere to the common
law of evidence as modified by the Canada Evidence Act. On Tuesday, it might
hear a civil negligence case (provincial, because a civil matter), in which it
would adhere to the common law of evidence as modified by the Nova Scotia
Evidence Act2.
1
2

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46.
Nova Scotia Evidence Act, RSNS 1989, c. 154.

9.06 Canadian litigation is adversarial in nature, and maintains the traditional
distinction between trier of law and trier of fact. Juries are available to
function as trier of fact in both criminal and civil cases, though they are more
common in the former than in the latter (and not terribly common in either).
Admissibility and weight
9.07 The basic concepts which underpin Canadian evidence law will be
familiar to most readers, particularly those in common law jurisdictions. At
trial, the judge (as trier of law) decides whether each item of evidence offered
284
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.10
by any party is admissible, so that it can it be placed before the trier of fact for
consideration in its decisions as to what the facts are. For evidence to be
admissible, it must be relevant to a fact that is material. This is to say, the item
of evidence must have some tendency to make the existence of a fact more or
less probable; and that fact must be one that is at issue in the case1. Once an
item of evidence has been ruled admissible, it becomes part of the body of
evidence that the trier of fact, at the end of the trial, must ‘weigh’ in its exercise
of fact-finding. Weighing involves the trier of fact scrutinising the evidence,
deciding which parts are accepted and which rejected, in order to arrive at its
ultimate decision as to what the facts of the case were, and beyond that
whether one party or the other has proven its case in accordance with the
applicable burden and standard of proof.
1

For an excellent synopsis of these basic concepts, see David Paciocco, ‘“Truth and proof”: The
basics of the law of evidence in a “guilt-based” system’ (2000) 6 Can Crim L Rev 71.

9.08 Two points should be added. First, and generally speaking, in Canadian
evidence law admissibility is a low threshold, and defects in the quality or
reliability of the evidence will usually go to weight. This is somewhat less so in
criminal cases, where the rules of evidence are applied more strictly due to the
imperative that the accused receive a fair trial. Second, admissibility and
weight formally are kept separate. The trier of law, in making decisions on
admissibility, cannot impinge on the fact-finding role of the trier of fact, and
accordingly the trier of law does not weigh the evidence. To the extent that
certain kinds of evidence exceptionally require some weighing by the trial
judge in order to determine admissibility1, such weighing is confined simply to
determining whether the evidence in question could be the basis for a
reasonable finding of fact – the actual weighing is left to the trier of fact.
1

For example, in a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal by the defence in a criminal case,
the court is expected to engage in a ‘limited weighing’ of the evidence adduced by the Crown,
in order to ascertain whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict on the basis
of that evidence (see R v Arcuri, [2001] 2 SCR 828). With similar fact evidence, the potential
prejudice is so high that the judge is expected to conduct a detailed evaluation of the probative
value of the evidence, in effect a kind of limited weighing (see R v Handy, [2002] 2 SCR 908).
Similarly, with hearsay evidence, the key admissibility question is the reliability of the
proffered out-of-court statement (see R v Khelawon, [2006] 2 SCR 787).

Types of evidence
9.09 In litigation, evidence is typically adduced in the form of either oral
testimony given by witnesses, or real evidence. The label ‘real evidence’ covers
objects which are immediately relevant to the case (for instance, a cellular
telephone, a notebook computer), but also more specialised forms of real
evidence such as documents (both hard copy and electronic), photographs and
video recordings.
9.10 Evidence is also classified as being either direct or circumstantial, in
terms of the reasoning it is intended to sustain. The paradigmatic direct
evidence is witness testimony as to a particular fact – the relationship between
the evidence and the fact it is offered to prove is linear, and the trier of fact
either accepts or rejects the witness’s testimony in its fact-finding. Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, requires the trier of fact both to accept the proffered
285
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9.10 Canada
evidence as being true or authentic, and then to draw an inference that the
proffered evidence does prove the fact it is offered to prove. There is no real
hierarchy between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of their
probative value1.
1

Though in criminal cases where the Crown’s case is entirely circumstantial, it must be
conveyed to the jury ‘that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the
accused is guilty’ (R v Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 at [33]).

Primary and secondary evidence (relevance)
9.11 Canadian evidence law also maintains the distinction between primary
and secondary relevance, or more specifically the distinction between evidence
that is relevant to a primarily material fact or a secondarily material fact.
Evidence ‘is primarily material when it is about a question of fact that is put
into issue by a rule of law that has application in the case, and . . . is
secondarily material when it is about the value or credibility of other evidence
that has been called in the case.’1 As an example, an email from one party to
another offering a sale of goods will be primarily relevant, as it goes to the
material issue of whether there was a contract. The testimony of the
company’s records-keeper regarding the technical specifications of their email
storage system, by contrast, would be secondarily relevant, as it goes to the
integrity of the email and whether it is reliable enough to be admissible.
1

Paciocco, ‘Truth and proof’, p 97.

The rules of evidence
9.12 Beyond the basic relevance threshold, Canadian evidence law contains
all of the traditional canons of exclusion, such as those regarding character,
opinion, hearsay and so on. Over the last 30 years or so, the Supreme Court
of Canada has incorporated a very pro-admissibility or ‘inclusionary’ tone to
the law of evidence, by which all relevant and material evidence should
presumptively be admitted unless legal or policy grounds clearly point to its
exclusion1. The Court has buttressed this approach with an explicit effort to
replace formalism and categorisation in evidence law with principled flexibility
and discretion on the part of the trial judge. This ‘principled approach’ is
encapsulated by the phrase ‘evidence may be excluded where its probative
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect’, and of late the Court has sought
to re-cast much of traditional evidence law as being applications of this
principle2.
1

2

R v Corbett, [1988] 1 SCR 670 at 691. See also R v Seaboyer (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at
399.
Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, §1.2–1.30; Robert J. Currie,
‘The evolution of the law of evidence: Plus ca change . . . ?’, Canadian Criminal Law Review
15 (2011), pp 213–228.

9.13 Two other substantive evidence rules important to this chapter should be
mentioned:
286
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.16
(a)

(b)

1
2

Expert opinion: there is a distinct admissibility regime for the use of
expert opinion testimony at trial. To be admissible, the expert opinion
must be: relevant (both logically relevant and reliable enough to justify
its admission); necessary (meaning that it must provide information or
inferences which the trier of fact could not reach on its own without the
assistance of the expert); given by a properly qualified expert; and not
excluded by another rule of evidence1.
Privilege: various rules of privilege attach to evidence in certain
circumstances and exempt them from disclosure in either pre-trial
proceedings or at trial. Most important for litigation purposes are
solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege2. Solicitor-client privilege protects as confidential all communications between a lawyer and
any person regarding the provision of legal advice by the lawyer to that
person. Litigation privilege protects all communications (including
documents) generated by a party and its solicitor which are made in
contemplation of litigation, including for example communications
with experts.
R v Mohan, (1994), 29 CR (4th) 243 (SCC).
Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, pp 223–244. Also see Blank v Canada (Minister
of Justice), 2006 SCC 39; General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz, (1999) 45 OR (3d)
321, (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 241 (Ont CA).

9.14 Finally, as noted above, the common law of evidence is replaced or
modified by the evidence statutes that govern trial proceedings. Similar
modification can be done by the procedural rules that govern proceedings in
each jurisdiction, which might abridge privilege, compel disclosure, and so on.
These rules, where relevant, will be covered under the sections entitled ‘Civil
proceedings’ and ‘Criminal proceedings’ below.
Electronic documents
9.15 This sub-section will survey some current developments regarding the
admissibility of electronic evidence in Canada. Particular focus will be placed
on relatively recent statutory amendments which have entrenched rules for use
by courts in making admissibility decisions. Evidentiary and procedural points
which are very specific to either civil or criminal litigation will be dealt with in
the relevant sections below.
9.16 To understand the Canadian approach to electronic evidence, it is
important to realise that although policy-makers and law-makers recognise
that this kind of evidence is in some sense ‘new’ in form and nature, they also
realise that it can in substance be treated as documentary evidence – a kind of
evidence with which the courts are well-acquainted. While this is not
universally true, it is applicable to most kinds of electronic data that will be
submitted by the parties in litigation; ‘pure’ electronic data will not usually be
sought to be admitted, but is more likely to underpin an expert’s report.
Otherwise, most electronic evidence is most usefully assimilated to traditional
documentary evidence for the purposes of admissibility in court, and this tends
to be what Canadian courts have done1. Naturally, however, this needs to be
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9.16 Canada
executed with careful attention to the unique issues involved.
1

For a detailed (and critical) examination, see Ken Chasse, ‘Electronic records as documentary
evidence’, Canadian Journal of Law & Technology 1.6 (2007), p 141; and Gahtan, Electronic
Evidence, Ch 9.

9.17 The starting point in this area is the work done on the issue by the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), which adopted a Uniform
Electronic Evidence Act in 1998 (Uniform Act)1. In 1997, the ULCC’s working
group on electronic evidence noted2 that evidence law was in need of reform
vis-à-vis electronic documents, due in no small part to the tendency of courts
to blur the lines between three aspects of the admissibility of documents:
(a)

The hearsay rule: documents adduced for the truth of their contents will
be classified as hearsay.
Authentication: to admit a document there must be evidence adduced
that the document is what it is purported to be.
The best evidence rule: the preference at common law was for a party
relying on a document to provide the original of that document, or to
satisfy the court that it would be reasonable to accept a copy.

(b)
(c)

1

2

Available (with detailed commentary) online at: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&
sub=1u2.
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Electronic Evidence Act: Consultation Paper
(March 1997), available online at:
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?sec=1997&sub=1997hka.

9.18 Each of these evidentiary rules raises unique issues where electronic
documents are concerned, and the Uniform Act was formulated in an attempt
to encourage coherent law reform in this regard. The Uniform Act has been
adopted, either completely or in modified form, in ten Canadian jurisdictions1.
Accordingly, it is worth exploring in some detail, using the relevant Canada
Evidence Act provision as the focus2 for discussion3.
1

2

3

Including the Canada Evidence Act (ss 31.1–31.8), the Nova Scotia Evidence Act (ss 21A–H),
the Ontario Evidence Act, RSO 1990, c. E.23 (s 34.1), and most recently the Nunavut
Evidence Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c. E.8 (s 37.1). See the (slightly outdated) chart online at:
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/index.cfm?sec=4&sub=4b, under ‘Electronic Evidence Amendments’. Only Newfoundland, British Columbia and the Northwest Territories have yet to
adopt some form of electronic evidence legislation (Chasse, ‘Electronic records as documentary evidence’, p 142).
There are very few reported decisions on the application of these legislative provisions, and
nearly all of those which do exist are on the CEA provisions. We think this is due not to
under-use of the provisions, but rather because trial judges are simply applying them as a
matter of course, and seriously-fought motions that would result in a reported decision are few
and far between. The lack of decisions in civil cases (which, as will be recalled, are governed
by the provincial evidence legislation) may stem from the fact that the civil procedure
rules often contain rules requiring parties to object to the ‘integrity’ of a document either
during the discovery phase or not at all, which settles in advance many objections that might
otherwise be made at trial. But see Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc., 2012 NSSC 226, a
civil case, discussed below.
This section relies on the excellent scholarship on this point by John D. Gregory, ‘Canadian
electronic commerce legislation’ (2002) 17 BFLR 277, particularly at pp 327–338; and
Chasse, ‘Electronic records as documentary evidence’; also John D. Gregory, ‘The law goes
electronic’ in T. Archibald and R. Echlin (eds), Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2009 (2009),
Toronto: Carswell, pp 127–192; and Kelly Friedman, ‘Electronic evidence at trial’ (2009) 36
Adv. Q. 215.
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.22
9.19 While ‘electronic documents’ are sometimes electronic versions of paper
documents (for instance, a scan of an existing paper document that is saved on
a computer hard drive), much of the evidence required in litigation will be
generated on a computer and will only see the light of day as a print-out of that
data. The definition of ‘electronic document’ in the Uniform Act is broad
enough to prevent much court time being wasted on the topic, as it includes
both data ‘recorded or stored’ on a computer system as well as ‘a display,
print-out or other output of that data.’1
1

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.8, although note that the term used in the Canada Evidence Act is
‘electronic document’, even though the Uniform Act used the term ‘electronic record’.
Legislative practice is uneven in Canada, though the phrase ‘electronic document’ is favoured
in some fora because it is easier to translate into French (John D. Gregory, ‘The law goes
electronic,’ p 128, fn 3). We have used the two terms interchangeably here, but see Saturley v
CIBC World Markets Inc., 2012 NSSC 226, discussed below.

9.20 In terms of authentication of electronic documents, the Uniform Act
codifies the common law rule which places the burden on the party adducing
the document to provide ‘evidence capable of supporting a finding that the
electronic document is that which it is purported to be.’1 Given the use of the
words ‘capable of supporting a finding’, this is best read as a strictly evidential
burden; whether the document actually is what it purports to be will ultimately
be decided by the trier of fact2.
1
2

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.1.
Gregory, ‘Canadian electronic commerce legislation’, p 331.

Best evidence rule
9.21 The other functional hurdle to the admissibility of a document is the best
evidence rule. Traditionally, this rule was designed to compel a party to
demonstrate the integrity of a document by either providing the original or by
demonstrating that the copy adduced was sufficiently trustworthy for use by
the court. The rule maps poorly on to electronic documents, which often
cannot be traced down to an ‘original’, particularly in a networked environment. In addition, the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘copy’ is not of much
use, because there is usually in practice no discernible difference between the
original and the copy. Thus, the original is not likely to be more clearly reliable
than a copy.
9.22 The Uniform Act provisions provide the courts with an alternative means
of assessing the integrity of electronic documents. They permit the adducing
party to satisfy the best evidence rule for an electronic document by providing
evidence as to ‘the integrity of the electronic documents system by or in which
the electronic document was recorded or stored.’1 Several presumptions are set
up to allow efficient proof of integrity, which can be established through: proof
that the storage medium was operating properly2; proof that the document was
recorded or stored, or recorded and stored by an adverse party3; or proof that
the document was recorded or stored in the ordinary course of business by a
party outside the litigation4. This integrity can be proven by way of affidavit5,
though depending on the nature of the technology, expert evidence may be
289
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9.22 Canada
required6.
1

2
3
4
5

6

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.2(1)(a). Note also the special provision regarding print-outs of
documents, which are deemed to satisfy the best evidence rule ‘if the print-out has been
manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used as a record’ (Canada Evidence Act,
31.2(2)). For a case where neither was satisfied, see R v Bellingham, 2002 ABPC 41.
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(a).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(b).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(c).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.6(1). See R v Morgan, [2002] N.J. No. 15 (NLPC); R v Adams,
2009 NSPC 15.
For example, see R v Gratton, 2003 ABQB 728.

9.23 The provisions also allow for evidence to be provided of current
standards, procedures and practices with regard to the integrity of the
recording or storing system1. This evidence can go to the integrity of the
electronic document system, but is also directed at ‘determining under any
rule of law whether an electronic document is admissible,’ and thus could also
be used as a source of evidence of the ‘reliability’ of a document for hearsay
purposes2. The provision seems to allow parties to test the evidence against
current industry standards such as the Standards on Electronic Records as
Documentary Evidence generated by the Canadian General Standards Board3,
or analogous standards from the International Standards Organization, for
example. Such standards are not binding on the court, but will no doubt be
persuasive.
1
2

3

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.5.
In Canadian evidence law, the basis of admissibility of hearsay is whether the evidence is
‘necessary’ and ‘reliable’. See generally, Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, pp
113–128.
CAN/CGSB 72.34–2005 (1 December 2005), available (by purchase) at: http://www.techstre
et.com/cgi-bin/detail?product_id=1252845.

9.24 It is worth emphasising that the Uniform Act scheme is not a complete
package for the admissibility of electronic documents. Rather, it confirms the
application of the common law of authentication to electronic documents, and
provides a means by which parties may satisfy the best evidence rule1. The
documents will still have to satisfy any other applicable rules of evidence in
order to be admitted, such as exceptions to the hearsay rule2.
1

2

It has been opined that, due to the electronic copying mechanisms used in the twentieth
century, the best evidence rule was fading into obscurity; for which, see Bryant, Lederman and
Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, §18.24. Recognition that electronic document
generation and storage raises its own issues has motivated, correctly in our view, this apparent
revival of the rule.
For instance, see R v Jiao, 2005 BCPC 12.

9.25 An interesting issue which came up in a recent civil case is whether there
is a distinction between an electronic ‘record’ and an electronic ‘document’.
Recall that the Uniform Act uses the phrase ‘electronic record’, though the
Canada Evidence Act uses the phrase ‘electronic document’. The Uniform
Law Conference’s explanatory memo1 on the deliberations leading to the
Uniform Act does not appear to anticipate a distinction between the two. Yet
this issue was raised in the recent decision of Justice Michael Wood of the
290
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.25
Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc2. The
Nova Scotia Evidence Act uses the phrase ‘electronic record’ as the relevant
term of art3.
At issue in Saturley was data automatically generated by software that
registered investment trading transactions, which was led as part of the defence
to a wrongful dismissal claim by an investment advisor. The defendant argued
that while this data constituted ‘electronic records’ under the Evidence Act, it
was not a ‘document’ because it was generated without human intervention.
Therefore, it was ‘real evidence’ and not subject to the presumption of
reliability designed to satisfy the best evidence rule. Justice Wood agreed, citing
the following passage from Graham Underwood and Jonathan Penner:
‘A record that is created by a computer system whose function it is to capture
information about cellular telephone calls would be introduced as real evidence, and
the record could be relied upon for the truth of its contents without resort to any
exception to the hearsay rule. Because the information that is captured (the date,
time and duration of the call, for example) is recorded automatically without being
filtered through a human observer, the condition for real ESI evidence is satisfied. It
is also important to note that the information recorded is itself not an out-of-court
statement by a human declarant, but rather it consists of objective information that
is captured and recorded by an automated process.
On the other hand, if a record is created by a human sitting at a computer keyboard
and entering data, the ESI embodied in the record could not be tendered as real
evidence if it is offered for the truth of its contents, and its proponent would have
to bring the record within the ambit of an exception to the rule against hearsay. The
record would be documentary evidence, and subject to the same limitations as
would apply to a conventional document. The information contained in the record
has been filtered through a human observer, and the ESI reflects the human
declarant’s out-of-court statements concerning what he or she observed, heard or
did. It is not real evidence.’4

At the time of writing this decision was quite new, and it will be interesting to
see what developments, if any, it generates. It may mean that in cases where
admissibility of electronic information is contested, it will matter a great deal
whether and to what extent there was any human intervention in the
generation of the data. And, as Justice Wood suggests, it could become quite
complicated, particularly where metadata is involved:
‘It is possible that a given item of electronic information may have aspects of both
real and documentary evidence. For example, an e-mail in electronic form will
include electronic data identifying the computer on which it was created and when
it was sent. That information is added automatically by the computer software and
would likely constitute real evidence. If the content of the e-mail is being introduced
for its truth, it would be considered a document and subject to admissibility as
such.’5
1

2
3
4

5

Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Electronic Evidence Act: Consultation Paper
(March 1997), available online at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?sec=1997&sub=
1997hka.
2012 NSSC 226.
Section 23A(b).
Graham Underwood and Jonathan Penner, Electronic Evidence in Canada, looseleaf (2010),
at 12-5 to 12-6, quoted in Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc., 2012 NSSC 226 at [16].
2012 NSSC 226 at [28].
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9.26 Canada
Web-based evidence
9.26 The issue of admissibility of web-based evidence began to attract some
judicial attention in Canada in the early part of this century. In ITV
Television Inc. v WIC Television Ltd1, a trademark dispute, the plaintiff ITV
sought leave to use the Internet in court in order to demonstrate certain
website mechanisms, such as hyperlinking and interactive streaming, and also
to prove what the content of various websites had been at specific times in the
past. The court, while accepting that any use of the Internet for truth of
contents of the web pages would be hearsay, found that the ‘Way Back
Machine’ at www.archive.org was a reliable means by which the previous
content of websites could be proven2.
1
2

2003 FC 1056, 29 CPR (4th) 182, (2003) FTR 203.
2003 FC 1056, 29 CPR (4th) 182, (2003) FTR 203 at [13]–[15]. The Federal Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision (2005 FCA 96) but expressly declined to rule on this issue; Pelletier J.A.
commented ‘the record is not sufficiently developed to provide an adequate factual underpinning for an informed consideration of the legal issues raised by the use of the internet as a
source of documentary evidence’ (at [30]).

9.27 The court also opined in obiter dicta that ‘official’ websites, such as those
of governments and well-known organisations, could ‘provide reliable evidence that would be admissible as evidence.’1 An ‘unofficial’ website, by
contrast, would have to be assessed with regard to its sources, independent
corroboration, consideration as to whether it might have been modified from
what was originally available, and assessment of the objectivity of the person
placing the information online. When these factors cannot be ascertained, little
or no weight should be given to the information obtained from an unofficial
website2.
1

2

2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 CPR (4th) 182, (2003) FTR 203 at [17]. In a subsequent case this
passage was cited in support of what appeared to be a presumption of reliability for ‘an
electronic directory of articles published in dailies and magazines known in Canada’
(Moulinsart S.A. v 9200-2880 Quebec Inc. (2008), 74 CPR (4th) 349 (Trademarks Opposition Board)).
2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 CPR (4th) 182, (2003) FTR 203 at [18].

9.28 In principle, use of the web itself as a means of proving web content at
a given point in time should be uncontroversial, so long as the means by which
the proof is given is sufficiently reliable. The court’s remarks in the ITV
decision have been applied in a number of cases regarding whether and when
web content can properly form part of affidavits1, usually because parties have
not complied with the requirements of affidavit-writing which are themselves
designed to establish the reliability of the affidavit and its exhibits. This kind
of proof may create problems at the disclosure stage, but the problems are
mostly technological rather than legal, and not insurmountable if the parties
are able to devote sufficient resources to solving them.
1

Thorpe v Honda Canada, Inc., 2010 SKQB 39; Adams v Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers’ Council, 2010 SKQB 308; Aria Brands Inc. et al v Air Canada et al, 2011 ONSC 4003;
Ontario v Rothmans et al., 2011 ONSC 5356.

9.29 As to the hearsay content of websites, while it is possible to be
sympathetic to the desire to have ‘official’ websites considered to be reliable
enough to escape the full rigour of the hearsay rule, there would need to be set
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.31
criteria as to how such reliability should be established – a task perhaps best
accomplished by amendment of the relevant evidence statutes. Otherwise, the
hearsay rule can be effectively utilised to exclude website content of dubious
reliability when it is introduced1.
1

See Crookes v De Simone, 2007 BCCA 515, where documents posted on a website, which
purported to be minutes of a meeting, were ruled to be inadmissible because they were hearsay
and there was no evidence as to who had posted the documents. In R v Juneja, 2010 ABCA
262, website advertisements for prostitution were ruled admissible because their content was
verified at trial by witness testimony.

9.30 This is not to say that website content is not often admitted and
considered as evidence in litigation, only that admissibility is seemingly not
often contested1. To the extent that the evidence is seriously considered, it is
around the question of what it proves or what inferences should be drawn
from it. As a prime example, there has recently been an increase in the use, as
evidence, of content contained in social networking sites2. Canadian courts
have shown increasing comfort with using both photographs and posted text
as a means of proving or disproving relevant facts3, often with little or no
attention to their electronic nature – though the latter observation supports the
point made above, that lawyers and courts are mostly assimilating electronic
evidence to documentary evidence, with which they are more conversant.
1

2

3

In one decision, a trial court apparently admitted a Wikipedia® entry as evidence on a
contested fact, though it was only one part of the evidence on point and the court did not
indicate what weight was being placed on it (Build-A-Vest Structures Inc. v Red Deer (City),
2006 ABQB 869). By comparison, in Zhurihin v Zhurihin, 2010 ONSC 6354 the court
declined to admit a graph regarding the price of diesel fuel, ‘apparently printed out from some
unnamed source on the internet, perhaps Wikipedia’ (at [31]), because ‘Without knowing the
source of the information, or who obtained it, I cannot give it any weight’ (at [33]). An
interesting decision in which a court heard expert evidence on the weight that should be given
to web-based documents was Jalil v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006
FC 246.
For an overview, see Pamela D. Pengelley, ‘Fessing up to Facebook: Recent trends in the use
of social network websites for civil litigation’, Canadian Journal of Law & Technology 7
(2009), pp 319–330. Social media has raised more significant issues in the context of discovery
in civil litigation, regarding which para 9.51 ff below.
For instance, see Hollingsworth v Ottawa Police Services Board [2007] OJ No 5134 (Ont
SCJ); Pawlus c. Hum [2008] JQ No 12565 (JCQ); Goodridge (Litigation Guardian of) v King
[2007] OJ No 4611 (Ont SCJ); (CMR) v ODR 2008 NBQB 253; Kourtesis v Joris [2007] OJ
No 5539 (Ont SCJ), all cited in Pamela D. Pengelley, ‘Fessing up to Facebook: Recent trends
in the use of social network websites for civil litigation’, nn 24–26.

Electronic signatures
Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (UECA)
9.31 In 1999, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada adopted the Uniform
Electronic Commerce Act (UECA), as a template or model for electronic
contracts and other issues arising in the emerging field of electronic commerce.
While merely introduced as a suggestive model, this legislation has in fact been
adopted in either identical or very similar terms in each provincial jurisdiction
across Canada1. For this reason, when examining the issue of electronic
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9.31 Canada
signatures and web-based contracts, the UECA is an excellent place to start.
1

In Canada, authority over property and civil rights is given to the provinces by virtue of
s 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The following is a list of the electronic commerce acts
adopted by each province or territory: Electronic Transactions Act, RSA 2000, c. E-5.5
[Alberta]; Electronic Transactions Act, SBC 2001, c. 10 [British Columbia]; The Electronic Commerce and Information Act, SM 2000, c. 32 [Manitoba]; Electronic Transactions
Act, SNB 2001, c. E-5.5 [New Brunswick]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNL 2001, c. E-5.2
[Newfoundland & Labrador]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNS 2000, c. 26 [Nova Scotia];
Electronic Commerce Act, SO 2000, c. 17 [Ontario]; Electronic Commerce Act, RSPEI 1988
c. E-4.1 [Prince Edward Island]; Electronic Commerce Act, RSY 2000, c. 66 [Yukon]; An Act
to Establish a Legal framework for information technology, RSQ c. C-1.1 [Quebec]; Electronic
Information and Documents Act, 2000, SS 2000, c. E-7.22 [Saskatchewan]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNu 2004, c. 7 [Nunavut]; Electronic Transactions Act, SNWT 2011, c. 13
[Northwest Territories].

9.32 The basic concept underpinning the UECA is that of ‘functional equivalency’. Under this concept, any information conveyed via electronic means
(such as through email correspondence or over the Internet) is as legally
binding and enforceable as if it had been conveyed via traditional means (eg in
writing). This arises from s 5 of the UECA which states that ‘information shall
not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely by reason that it is in
electronic form’. As mentioned earlier, each provincial act modelled on the
UECA contains a similar provision. Functional equivalency, then, is of central
importance for electronic trade and commerce in that it applies to the very
basic components of contracts (such as offer and acceptance); this section has
been interpreted to mean that any contract entered into via electronic means is
functionally equivalent in law to one entered into via traditional means1.
1

On this generally, together with the Canadian case law on electronic signatures, see Stephen
Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (3rd edn, 2012), Cambridge University Press.

Electronic signatures
9.33 With specific regard to electronic signatures, it is perhaps helpful to
examine some of the provisions of Nova Scotia’s Electronic Commerce Act to
get a sense of what provincial legislation says on this specific issue. First, s 2(b)
of the Act defines ‘electronic signature’ as ‘information in electronic form that
a person has created or adopted in order to sign a document and that is in,
attached to or associate with the document’1. Section 11 goes on to state that
electronic signatures are equivalent to conventional signatures. Finally, s 21
expressly authorises the formation of electronic contracts and allows the
communication of both offer and acceptance by electronic means (eg clicking
an icon on a computer screen); according to this section, electronic contracts
are legally binding and enforceable. While there have not been many cases
where courts have specifically dealt with this issue, it would appear as though
judges are willing to accept the functional equivalency rule above and assume
that an electronic contract is equally as valid as a written one unless proven
otherwise.
1

A review of this provision in the other provincial Acts reveals language that is virtually
identical to the definition contained in Nova Scotia’s Act.
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.36
Federal legislation
9.34 There are also provisions in (and under) the federal Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act1 dealing with electronic signatures.
‘Electronic signature’ is defined in s 31(1) as ‘a signature that consists of one
or more letters, characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form incorporated in, attached to or associated with an electronic document.’ This part
of the legislation deals with satisfying requirements under other legislation for
documents to be in writing, affixed with a signature, sworn, or otherwise
authentic, and allows for these requirements to be deemed complied with if the
document has a ‘secure electronic signature.’ In 2005, the government brought
in regulations pursuant to both PIPEDA and the CEA to define secure
electronic signatures. The Secure Electronic Signature Regulations2 provide for
a series of steps to be taken in order to generate a secure electronic signature3,
and enact a presumption that where those steps have been followed, the data
have been signed by the person identified in the digital signature certificate.
1
2

3

S.C. 2000, c. 5 (PIPEDA).
SOR/2005-30; Barbara McIsaac QC and Howard R Fohr, ‘Legal update, Canada: PIPEDA’s Secure Electronic Signature Regulations have been published’, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review 2 (2005), pp 71–72.
Sections 2(a)–(e).

Computer-generated animations and simulations
9.35 An issue emerging in Canadian case law is the admissibility of computergenerated images, usually digital animation, as a means of helping to explain
or contextualise expert or lay witness testimony – in short, as demonstrative
evidence. Canadian courts have been dealing with more general issues
surrounding the power and potential prejudice of demonstrative evidence for
some time, and have paid attention to the distorting effect such evidence can
have on the trier of fact1. However, there have to date been relatively few
reported cases dealing directly with the admissibility of digitally-generated
evidence2.
1
2

See R v MacDonald, (2000), 35 CR (5th) 130 (Ont.C.A.); R v Hummel, 2001 YKSC 508.
See McCutcheon v Chrysler Canada Ltd., [1998] OJ No 5818 (Gen Div); Sovani v Jin,
2005 BCSC 1852; R v Scotland, [2007] OJ No 5304 (Ont SCJ); Torok v Sekhon, 2010 BCSC
850.

9.36 Those cases which have arisen (generally in jury trials) have tended to
apply the same test generally used for disputed demonstrative evidence: does it
pass a cost-benefit analysis, in terms of its probative value being outweighed by
its prejudicial effect? To wit, will it help the jury to understand the evidence
without creating undue sympathy towards the party proffering the evidence,
and/or otherwise distorting the fact-finding process? In making this determination, trial judges have focused on how closely the digital images match the
subject matter they are intended to represent and whether they are overly
one-sided on hotly contested factual issues1. Demonstrative evidence that uses
a computer also tends to require expert testimony, and thus the expert opinion
rules will usually need to be applied. We are not convinced that this test needs
any further development, since it is consistent with the Supreme Court of
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9.36 Canada
Canada’s policy of encouraging trial judge discretion in evidentiary matters.
None the less, the issue remains open and may see more consideration in the
near future.
1

For a solid (albeit American) source, see Betsy S. Fiedler, ‘Are your eyes deceiving you? The
evidentiary crisis regarding the admissibility of computer generated evidence’, New York Law
School Law Review 48.1 and 48.2 (2003–2004), p 295.

Video-tape and security camera evidence
9.37 It has been unambiguously clear in Canada since the Supreme Court’s decision in Nikolovski1 that a trier of fact, whether jury or judge sitting alone, is
entitled to rely exclusively on the viewing of security camera evidence in
order to establish the identity of an accused. In that case, the accused was
charged with robbing a convenience store and the clerk, the only eye witness,
was not able to identify the accused with any level of certainty, either in court
or beforehand. However, the incident had been recorded by a security camera,
and the footage was described by the Court as ‘of excellent quality and great
clarity’. Indeed, the majority noted that ‘[a]t one point, it is almost as though
there was a close-up of the accused taken specifically for identification
purposes’. In those circumstances, they held, it was open to the trial judge to
conclude that the accused was the person recorded on the tape, without the
need for any corroborative evidence.
1

R v Nikolovski, [1996] 3 SCR 1197.

9.38 There are of course various considerations to be taken into account. It
must be established that the tape has not been altered or changed in any way,
and the quality of the tape affects the amount of weight that can be given to
the evidence. The length of time in which the accused appears on the tape
might also be a factor in some cases. Triers of fact should be particularly
cautious about convicting if the only evidence of identification comes from a
videotape, and should bear in mind that they must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt. Indeed, a judge who cannot identify an accused based on his
or her own viewing of surveillance photographs ought not to rely on an
in-court identification made by police officers based on those same photographs.1 Nonetheless, if all the factors are taken into account properly, then it
is permissible for identity to be established based solely on security camera
footage.
1

R v Cranham, 2012 ONCA 457.

9.39 This rule applies in particular in the context of cameras set up to detect
vehicles which are either speeding or failing to observe traffic signals. Note,
however, in that context that some provinces have created statutory schemes in
which license plate numbers are proven by way of a certificate provided by an
officer responsible for the scheme, certifying that he or she has examined the
photograph and determined the license number. In such cases, courts have held
that it is irrelevant if the trier of fact is not personally able to read the license
number from the photograph. Rather, in such cases the only approach open to
the accused to challenge the evidence is to call the officer who issued the
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Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.42
certificate for cross-examination1.
1

See for example R v Guinn, [1997] BCJ No 3046; or R v Eged, 2009 BCPC 180.

Freedom of information and privacy
9.40 Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection statutes exist in Canada
at the federal level and in each province and territory1. For the most part they
are intended to prescribe privacy protection standards for the commercial
sector, requiring businesses not to collect more private information than
necessary, not to disclose it, and most particularly to disclose their privacy
policies to customers. However, there has been an odd and unexpected
interaction between privacy protection statutes and criminal investigative
techniques, which ironically has tended to reduce privacy protection through
the use of privacy protection legislation. It has arisen in the context of police
seeking to determine IP addresses, typically in the context of investigating
possession of child pornography charges.
1

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) (SC 2000, c.5);
Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c. P-6.5; Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c. 165; Personal Information Protection Act, SBC
2003, c. 63; The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SM 1997, c. 50;
Protection of Personal Information Act, SNB 1998, c. P-19.1; Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c. A-1.1; Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c. 5; Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act,
SNS 2006, c. 3; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c. F.31;
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c. M.56;
Personal Health Information Protection Act, SO 2004, c. 3; Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c. F-15.01; An Act Respecting Access to Documents
held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, RSQ c. A-2.1; The Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c. F-22.01; The Health Information
Protection Act, SS 1999, c. H-0.021; The Local Authority Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c. L-27.1; Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, SNWT 1994, c. 20; Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSY
2002, c. 1.

9.41 This is discussed under Canadian criminal law, and in particular the law
of search and seizure, at greater length below. The point to be aware of here
is that, as a general rule, the police are obliged to have a warrant in order to
obtain any information in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. However, federal and provincial privacy protection statutes do allow,
in some circumstances, for the release of information in accordance with the
terms of the statute. In a number of cases, police have discovered in various
ways that child pornography has been downloaded to a particular IP address.
They have then, instead of obtaining a search warrant, asked the ISP for the
name and address of the person to whom that IP address had been assigned.
The effect, of course, is to provide evidence that that is the person who
committed the offence of possessing child pornography.
9.42 A number of courts have faced this situation. Although no clear
consensus has yet emerged, the tendency is for courts to find the evidence
admissible1. Two factors have most frequently settled the analysis, in one
direction or another. The first is the question of whether an accused has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information revealed. The argument
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9.42 Canada
against admitting the evidence is that conversations in a chat room can be
private communications, and therefore that the situation is analogous to an
interception. It is clear in Canadian law that there is a high expectation of
privacy in such private communications, and so if that analogy is accepted then
the warrant requirement would certainly be enforced. Most courts which have
allowed the evidence to be used, however, have downplayed the analogy
between releasing a name and investigative techniques such as interception.
Instead, they have concluded that the only information revealed by the ISP is
the accused’s name and address, and that a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her name and address.
1

R v Kwok, [2008] O.J. No. 2414 (Ont.C.J.) found that the evidence was not admissible, as did
the court in R v Cuttell, 2009 ONCJ 471. Cases admitting the evidence include R v Ward,
2008 ONCJ 355 (Ont.C.J.); R v Friers, 2008 ONCJ 740 (Ont.C.J.); R v Trapp, 2011 SKCA
143; R v Wilson, [2009] O.J. No. 1067 (Ont.C.J.); R v McNeice, 2010 BCSC 1544; and R v
Siemens, 2011 SKPC 57.

9.43 One might argue that a mere matter of timing should not be given the
significance many courts give it. In the case of an interception, the name of the
person is identified, and then private information is obtained: in the case of an
IP address, the private information is obtained first, and then the name. The
net effect is the same – linking the particular information to a particular person
– and so it is hard to see a principled reason that a different result should
follow in the two cases. None the less, that is the tendency to date.
9.44 The second factor which has been in play is the existence of a contract
between the ISP and the customer and the statutory provision allowing
non-consensual disclosure of information ‘for the purpose of enforcing any
law of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for
the purpose of enforcing any such law.’1 This is the ironic effect which privacy
protection legislation has had on individual privacy protection. This provision
might merely be intended to shield the ISP from liability to its customer if it
were faced with a warrant or other pre-existing legal mechanism requiring it
to disclose personal information without that customer’s consent. However,
some courts have relied on provisions of this sort, or on the contractual terms
with the ISP, as creating a new basis for police to obtain the information,
without the need to obtain a warrant. Sometimes this is because the legislation
is seen as creating a search power itself, and sometimes because the existence
of the contract (which envisages potential disclosure) is seen as demonstrating
that the subscriber does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information.2 See the further discussion of reasonable expectation of privacy
below, at para 9.76 ff. The proper interpretation of PIPEDA in this regard
might remain unsettled. Legislation which is at the time of this writing before
the Canadian Parliament would accomplish the same purpose through a
different Act: see the discussion of the Investigating and Preventing Criminal
Electronic Communications Act at para 9.75 below.
1
2

PIPEDA, s 7(3)(c.1).
See for example R v Spencer, 2011 SKCA 144; R v Chehil, 2009 NSCA 111; or R v Lo, 2011
ONSC 6527.
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Civil proceedings1 9.46
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS1
1

Two general resources for Canadian civil procedure are: L. Abrams and K. McGuinness,
Canadian Civil Procedure Law (2nd edn, 2010), LexisNexis; Janet Walker and Garry D.
Watson, The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials (7th edn, 2010), Emond
Montgomery.

9.45 Civil cases in Canada are conducted under civil procedure rules (or
‘rules of court’)1, which exist for every court which has jurisdiction over civil
matters. The vast bulk of civil cases occur in the provincial superior courts,
while certain specialised civil cases in federal jurisdiction are heard in the
Federal Court of Canada. While the procedural rules vary, sometimes widely,
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there is a reasonably coherent and generalised
body of procedural law in place in the country at large. The civil procedure
rules in each jurisdiction govern every aspect of a civil case, from initiating
proceedings through to appeals. While electronic evidence issues may arise at
many stages, they are most pressing at the stage of documentary discovery, on
which this very brief overview will focus2.
1

2

For instance the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Made under the Courts of Justice Act, RRO
1990, Reg. 194; the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, Made by the Judges of the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia; and the Federal Court Rules.
For a broad overview of electronic discovery issues, see Dan Pinnington, ‘Needle in a haystack’
(2006) 15/4 National 42.

Before action
9.46 Canadian law and procedure provide that, in some circumstances,
discovery may take place prior to litigation commencing. Authorisation for
pre-action discovery is found either in specific civil procedure rules (in those
provinces which have a reception date prior to the development of equitable
pre-action discovery in English law) or in the inherent jurisdiction of the court
(for those provinces with later reception dates or where it is specifically
provided for in the rules)1. Two noteworthy brands of effectively pre-action
discovery have emerged of late. One is the ‘John Doe’ or ‘rolling Anton Piller’
order2, essentially an Anton Piller order issued in intellectual property cases
where the plaintiff is aware that copyright or trademark is being infringed but
does not know the identity of the infringers. The order is issued ex parte, and
executed on the infringer’s premises or property once its identity is known to
the plaintiff. The second is the Norwich order, which allows a potential
plaintiff to ‘demand disclosure of full information from wrongdoers or third
parties that are mixed up in the wrongdoing’ prior to beginning an action3.
There have been increasing attempts to use Norwich-type orders to compel
ISPs and others to disclose the identity of users who posted allegedly
defamatory comments online4, though not without some controversy over the
use of unsubstantiated allegations to obtain what would otherwise be private
information5.
1

2

See generally Glaxo Wellcome PLC v Minister of National Revenue (1998), 162 DLR (4th)
433 (Fed CA).
See generally D. Drapeau and J. Cullen, ‘Anton Piller Orders and the Federal Court of Canada’
(2004) 17 IPJ 301.
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3

4

5

Randall W. Block, Michael A. Marion and R. J. Daniel Gilborn, ‘Sealed Ex Parte Norwich
Orders: Safeguarding against abuse of the pre-action disclosure remedy’ in T. Archibald and
M. Cochrane (eds), Annual Review of Civil Litigation (2003), p 231.
York University v Bell Canada Enterprises 2009 CanLII 46447 (Ont SCJ); Mosher v Coast
Publishing Ltd 2010 NSSC 153; A.B. v Bragg Communications Inc 2010 NSSC 215; Doucette
v New Brunswick News 2010 NBQB 233; Warman v Fournier 2010 ONSC 2126; Morris v
Johnson 2011 ONSC 3996; Ventures v John Doe 2011 YKSC 60. In Latner v Doe 2010
ONSC 4989, the plaintiff had begun a defamation action against John Doe, and was granted
an order compelling a witness (his brother) to provide information about the identity of the
individual who posted the online material (also, apparently, the same brother).
Warman v Fournier 2010 ONSC 2126.

Discovery
General mechanics of documentary discovery
9.47 Under each set of procedural rules, all parties to a civil action are obliged
to disclose and produce documents which are relevant and not privileged. This
is a unilateral obligation with which each party must comply on its own
initiative, and is typically completed after the close of pleadings. Documentary
discovery generally comprises two steps. First, the party prepares a list of all
relevant documents which the party has or at one time had in its control or
possession1, and provides this list to the other parties as well as filing it with
the court. Second, the opposing parties formally are entitled to inspect and
obtain copies of the relevant and non-privileged documents, though in practice
copies are delivered between and among the parties within specified timeframes. Most civil procedure rules also provide for documentary discovery
from non-parties2. The definition of ‘document’ or ‘record’ is invariably very
broad, and the rules’ drafters have clearly intended that the term catch
virtually everything that might be considered ‘electronic evidence’, including
the contents of computers, BlackBerries®, Palm Pilots®, PDAs and the
like3. Courts have also shown a willingness to order the production of
metadata where it is demonstrably relevant4.
1

2
3

4

In some jurisdictions the list is just that, a list, but most typically the ‘list’ takes the form of an
affidavit or sworn statement by the party to the effect that the list contains all known relevant
documents (eg Nova Scotia Rule 15, Ontario Rule 30.03). The latter type of rule often imposes
the additional requirement that counsel swear that he/she has explained the discovery
obligation to his or her client.
For instance, Nova Scotia Rule 14, Ontario Rule 30.10.
For instance, see CIBC World Markets Inc. v Genuity Capital Markets, [2005] OJ No 614
(Ont SCJ); Portus Alternative Asset Management Inc. et al., Re (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 2670 (Ont
Sec Comm); Desgagne v Yuen et al., 2006 BCSC 955. As will be seen below, Nova
Scotia’s new Rules contain a separate regime for disclosure of ‘electronic information’.
Desgagne v Yuen et al., 2006 BCSC 955 at [26]–[34]; Abougoush v Sauve, 2011 BCSC 885.

Electronic discovery
9.48 The unique issues associated with the discovery of electronic documents,
as well as differing levels of familiarity with technological issues among the bar
and judiciary, has made electronic discovery (or ‘e-discovery’) a topic of great
interest in Canada in the recent past1. In 2005, a leading Canadian e-discovery
expert commented regarding Canada that ‘judicial reasoning exploring the
obligations of the parties to produce electronic evidence remains in its
300
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Civil proceedings1 9.49
infancy’2, and in terms of reported cases this is still somewhat true. For the
moment the struggle for coherence is being played out in the procedural
setting. However, the judiciary and the litigation bar have moved ahead with
developing this area of practice. First, in 2005 the Ontario Bar Association’s Discovery Task Force3 developed and issued the Electronic Discovery
Guidelines4, drawing on similar work done in the US, most notably by the
Sedona Conference. The objective of the Electronic Discovery Guidelines was
to develop a set of ‘best practices’ for counsel involved in electronic discovery,
and specifically to: prevent and resolve discovery disputes; provide for efficient
and cost-effective means of meeting discovery obligations; and suggest technology options that may ease the process5. The Guidelines are intended to have
no binding effect, but simply to ‘provide an appropriate framework to address
how to conduct e-discovery, based on norms that the bench and bar can adopt
and develop over time as a matter of practice.’6 The Ontario Bar Association
has, since that time, continued to develop e-discovery resources by way of its
Ontario E-Discovery Implementation Committee, such as the ‘10 Guiding
Principles to Minimize Discovery Costs.’7
1

2

3

4
5
6

7

See Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle (eds), E-Discovery in Canada (2nd edn, 2011);
Graham Underwood and Jonathan Penner, Electronic Evidence in Canada, looseleaf (2010).
Susan Wortzman, ‘Spoliation, preservation and other “gotchas:” The U.S. & Canadian
Jurisprudence’ (2005) 4/2 LawPRO 7, p 8.
The Ontario Bar Association (OBA) is a provincial branch of the Canadian Bar Association,
a voluntary membership organisation which provides support to the legal profession through
legal education and ‘representation to government on topics of current concern’.
Available online at http://www.oba.org/en/pdf_newsletter/E-DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf.
Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, pp 1–2.
Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, pp 1–2. Prior to the release of The Sedona Canada
Principles (regarding which see below), the OBA Guidelines were beginning to appear with
some frequency in the case reports; see Sycor Tehcnology Inc. v Kiaer, 2005 CanLII 46736
(Ont. SCJ); Air Canada v WestJet Airlines Ltd., 2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont SCJ); Spielo
Manufacturing Inc. v Doucet, 2007 NBCA 85; Andersen v St. Jude Medical Inc., [2008] O.J.
No. 430 (Ont SCJ).
Available online, along with other resources, at http://www.oba.org/En/publicaffairs_en/E-Di
scovery/model_precedents.aspx.

9.49 Second, in 2008 The Sedona Conference, a US-based non-profit research
and educational institute, released The Sedona Canada Principles Addressing
Electronic Discovery1. This document is a compilation of principles and best
practices for addressing the technical, legal and cost issues involved in the
disclosure and discovery of electronic information in civil litigation. It builds
on an earlier document generated by The Sedona Conference for use in the US,
now in its second edition. However, The Sedona Canada Principles were
formulated by a primarily Canadian panel of judges and lawyers with expertise
in electronic evidence matters (including Colin Campbell I of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice and Ted Scanlan J of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court), and designed to mesh with the procedural discovery rules of
all Canadian jurisdictions. The overall scheme of the Principles is to encourage
parties to reach agreement, as much as possible, on problems unique to the use
of electronic information in litigation, such as: the preservation of potentially
relevant electronically-stored data; whether it is necessary to search for or
collect deleted or residual data; methods of collection, storage and review;
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9.49 Canada
format, content and organisation of information which is disclosed; and means
to protect privilege, privacy, trade secrets and other confidential information.
1

Available online at http://www.lexum.com/e-discovery/documents/SedonaCanadaPrinciples
01-08.pdf.

9.50 The Sedona Canada Principles are a leading source of expert commentary on e-discovery and have quickly been adopted for use by litigants and the
courts1. A particularly noteworthy development was the enactment, by the
Nova Scotia judiciary, of a discrete civil procedure rules dedicated to
e-discovery, or more accurately the disclosure of ‘electronic information’. The
new Rule 16 is clearly derived from the Sedona Canada Principles2, and it is
tailored to the realities of e-discovery in a manner that the procedural rules of
other jurisdictions are not, since the latter rely on a broad definition of
‘document’ and older discovery principles which do not always smoothly
integrate with electronic information. So, for example, Rule 16 contains
separate definitions of ‘document’, ‘electronic information’ and ‘storage
medium’, and imposes requirements regarding the disclosure of metadata and
the use of ‘readily exchangeable’ storage media. It essentially imposes three
duties on parties to litigation:
(1)
(2)

to search for relevant electronic information;
to preserve data by making copies of it, which is a continuing obligation
throughout the litigation; and
to disclose relevant information to other parties.

(3)

The clear intention behind the rule is for the parties to reach agreement on a
disclosure regime that will be suited to the specifics of the case in which they
are involved, but in the absence of agreement the Rule also contains a set of
default provisions which can be imposed, as well as a discretionary role for the
court in imposing appropriate disclosure upon motion by a party. While it is
anticipated that other courts will enact specific e-discovery rules in the near
future3, many of the provincial superior courts have formulated (often
Sedona-influenced) ‘Practice Directives’ or ‘Guidelines’ to assist parties engaging in e-discovery4.
1

2

3

4

For instance, see Innovative Health Group Inc. v Calgary Health Region 2008 ABCA 219;
Borst v Zilli 2009 CanLII 55302; Vector Transportation Services Inc. v Traffic Tech Inc 2008
CanLII 11050 (Ont. S.C.); L’Abbé v Allen-Vanguard Corp 2011 ONSC 4000 (Master).
And indeed, this is acknowledged in the online annotated version of the new Rules published
by the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society at http://nslaw.nsbs.org/nslaw/rule.do?id=16.
The Yukon Rules of Court do have a brief rule (25(18)) that explicitly anticipates e-discovery;
available online at http://www.yukoncourts.ca/courts/supreme/ykrulesforms.html
For example, Saskatchewan’s Practice Directive No. 6 (E-Discovery Guidelines), available
online at http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/Rules/practice.pdf, or Manitoba’s Guidelines Regarding Discovery of Electronic Documents, available online at http://ww
w.manitobacourts.mb.ca/pdf/qb_disc_of_edocuments.pdf.

E-discovery in practice1
1

For commentary, see: Alex Cameron and Nicole Melanson, ‘Obtaining electronic evidence
from non-parties’, (2010) 36 Adv. Q. 470; Berkley D. Sells and Ian Collins, ‘Strategies to
obtain electronic evidence’, (2009) 36 Adv. Q. 295; Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle,
‘Obtaining relevant electronic evidence’, (2009) 36 Adv. Q. 226.
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9.51 While it varies slightly between jurisdictions, ‘the general scope of
documentary discovery [in Canada] has tended to be extremely broad.’1 The
historical tendency has been for the courts to adhere to the traditional
Peruvian Guano standard2, and require the disclosure of documents which
tend to have a ‘semblance of relevancy’3 or any bearing on any question which
is or might be at play between the parties. In recent years, however, there has
been a spate of civil procedure reform that has been driven by the notion of
‘proportionality’, ie the amount of procedure required for a claim should bear
some rough parity with the amount involved and the importance of the issues4.
In discovery terms, this has meant that courts have begun to limit or restrict the
amount or scope of documentary disclosure obligations. Indeed, a number of
jurisdictions have incorporated ‘proportionality’ concerns into their rules of
court. In Nova Scotia, for example, the Civil Procedure Rules impose a
standard of ‘simple’ or ‘trial’ relevancy, meant to reduce the amount of
required disclosure5.
Though there is nothing new about litigation that may require massive and
onerous documentary production6, electronic data accumulates in huge quantities that may be difficult to search, let alone disclose, and may also be
functionally collected and stored within specialised software. In general terms
Canadian courts have sought to strike a balance: on the one hand upholding
the breadth of the discovery obligation, applying the broad definition of
‘document’ so as to include all manner of electronic data7, and making
determinations as to whether production should extend to data or to the
technical machinery which contains them8; and on the other hand, imposing
some sense of proportionality.
1
2

3

4

5

6

7
8

Janet Walker and Garry D. Watson, The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials, p 544.
Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882)
11 QBD 55, CA.
Eastern Canadian Coal Gas Venture Limited v Cape Breton Development Corp (1995), 141
NSR (2d) 180 (NSCA).
Martin Teplitsky, ‘Making civil justice work: A new vision’, (2008) 27(3) Advocates Journal,
p 7.
Rule 14. And see British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules, Rule 7-1; Rule 10.4(1.1) of the
Ontario Rules of Court.
See Peter Kiewit Sons Co. of Canada Ltd. v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority
(1982), 134 DLR (3d) 154 (BCSC).
For instance Robak Industries Ltd. v Gardner et al., 2005 BCSC 1133 (Master).
In Sourian v Sporting Exchange Ltd., 2005 CanLII 4938 (Ont SC, Master), for example, the
court held that the proper way of disclosing the relevant contents of a database was to require
the party to generate a report containing ‘the subset of relevant information in usable form’,
even though this meant that the party would actually have to create a document – an
order ‘significantly more intrusive than ordinary documents production’ (at [12]). On this
issue, see Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, p 7, n. 7.

9.52 If there has been a trend, it has been for courts to apply proportionality
whether or not it is explicitly required by their governing rules, and utilise
more frequently their discretion to decline to order production of documents
where to do so would be needlessly costly or oppressive1, or where the
information sought is of tangential relevance2. For example, in Baldwin Janzen
Insurance Services (2004) Ltd. v Janzen3, the plaintiff sought production of
mirror image copies of the defendant’s hard drives for forensic analysis.
Humphries J ruled that ‘[w]ithout some indication that the application of the
interesting technology might result in relevant and previously undisclosed
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9.52 Canada
documents, the privacy interests of the third parties and the avoidance of
unnecessary and onerous expense militate against allowing such a search
merely because it can be done.’4 In another e-discovery case, the Alberta Court
of Appeal5 acknowledged that production of a hard drive may result in
unnecessary access to irrelevant, immaterial and privileged information, and
thus should be reserved for cases where there is clear evidence that a party is
deliberately failing to disclose relevant documents6. It may be that the sheer
volume of work and expense required to complete some kinds of electronic
disclosure is indirectly compelling the courts to tighten up slightly the scope of
the production obligation, though whether this will be true in the long term
remains to be seen. On the other hand, as parties and courts become more
familiar with e-discovery, there have been decisions displaying more willingness on the part of the courts to simply order the parties to ‘roll up their
sleeves’ and comply with procedural obligations, despite the difficulty and
expense of so doing7.
An interesting development concurrent to the shift towards proportionality in
e-discovery has been increased judicial attention to the privacy interests of
litigants and third parties. This has been most manifest in cases involving social
media8. Typically, these cases involve plaintiffs in personal injury cases who
have claimed various kinds of injury and impairment, who are confronted by
defence demands for copies of photos and postings from their social media
profiles in order to test the validity of the claims9. Courts have generally
recognised that social media profiles contain a great deal of private information – even when shared with ‘friends’ – and have applied what seasoned civil
litigators would recognise as a presumption against ‘fishing expeditions’ that
seek broad discovery rights in situations where the defendant has not presented
sufficient facts to sustain invasive inquiries10. However, judges do not shy away
from sorting out which information is sufficiently relevant to be ordered
disclosed while at the same time applying proportionality, based on the issues
as raised in the pleadings11.
1

2
3
4

5
6

7
8

Dulong v Consumers Packaging Inc., [2000] OJ No 161 (Ont Sup Ct Jus, Comm List Master)
(QL). On cost-shifting, see Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, ‘The costs of e-discovery: A
practical approach,’ in Wortzman and Nickle, E-Discovery in Canada, Ch 7; Karen Groulx,
‘The issue of costs’ (2005) 4/2 LawPRO 9. And see Hummingbird v Mustafa, 2007 CanLII
39610 (Ont SC, Master).
Park v Mullen, 2005 BCSC 1813.
2006 BCSC 554.
2006 BCSC 554 at [36]. By contrast, however, see Chadwick v Canada (Attorney General),
2008 BCSC 851 (leave to appeal refused 2008 BCCA 346), where production of a mirror
image was reasonable because the parties disagreed on how a search of the hard drive should
be done and the defendants would otherwise be forced to rely on the assurances of the
plaintiff’s computer expert.
Innovative Health Group Inc. v Calgary Health Region, 2008 ABCA 219.
For the latter kind of case, see Vector Transportation Services Inc. v Traffic Tech Inc., 2008
CanLII 11050 (Ont SC).
See Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v Infineon Technologies AG, 2011 BCSC 1128.
See Pengelley, ‘Fessing up to Facebook’; Christopher J. Edwards and Michael D. Swindley,
‘Throwing the (Face)book at ’em. The use and abuse of social media in civil litigation:
Facebook, Twitter, the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct’,
(2011) 38 Adv. Q. 19; Ronald Podolny, ‘When “friends” become adversaries: Litigation in the
age of Facebook’, (2009) 33 Man. L.J. 391; Teresa Scassa, ‘Social networking, privacy and
civil litigation: Recent developments in Canadian law’, (2011) 8(8) Canadian Privacy Law
Review 77.
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9

10

11

In some cases, what is sought is evidence of the amount of time a plaintiff is able to spend using
a computer generally and social media specifically, to test claims of both physical and mental
impairment stemming from negligence; eg Bishop v Minichiello, 2009 BCSC 358; Carter
v Connors, 2009 NBQB 317.
For example, see Dosanjh v Leblanc, 2011 BCSC 1660. Though there is division of opinion
as to when the appropriate relevance threshold has been reached; compare Frangione v
Vandongen, 2010 ONSC 2823, with Schuster v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co. of
Canada, 2009 CanLII 58971 (ONSC).
See Morabito v DiLorenzo, 2011 ONSC 7379; Fric v Gershman, 2012 BCSC 614.

9.53 The procedural regime in each jurisdiction provides for penalties or
remedies for failure by a party to produce relevant evidence. A good example
is found in Ontario Rule 30.08, which provides that failure to produce a
document could result in loss of ability to use the document at trial, revocation
or suspension of the party’s right to discover, or dismissal of the action.
Canadian courts, informed by the Sedona Canada Principles, are also slowly
recognising a duty to preserve evidence, which appears to arise once a party
knows of or should reasonably anticipate litigation1.
1

Doust v Schatz, 2002 SKCA 129. See also Gahtan, Electronic Evidence, pp 122–‘23. The New
Nova Scotia Rule 16, as noted above, explicitly imposes this duty.

9.54 All of the procedural rules give courts the discretion to order parties to
preserve evidence where necessary1, along with appropriate remedies for
failure to comply2 that may include a contempt order3. Beyond the latter,
however, the doctrine of spoliation is taking on new prominence in the
e-discovery context.4 Spoliation is well-established in Canada as an evidentiary
doctrine that creates a presumption that the destroyed evidence would have
operated unfavourably against the spoliating party5. However, the law is
currently uncertain as to whether spoliation is simply the mirror image of a
duty to preserve6, or whether there is an independent tort of spoliation7. The
leading decision is that of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Spasic (Estate) v
Imperial Tobacco Ltd.8, which affirmed the possible existence of a tort of
spoliation; however, the elements of such a tort have not been authoritatively
laid out. In any event, parties who destroy or materially alter evidence will
have an array of procedural relief, at least, available against them. While
Canadian courts have shown no inclination to impose the kinds of obligations
and sanctions which emerged from recent and prominent US decisions9,
developments are still at an early stage. In one interesting case, a motions judge
was hearing a defence ex parte motion for disclosure of social media evidence
by a personal injury plaintiff. He found on the facts that there was some
danger that the plaintiff would destroy data in her Facebook account if she was
ordered to disclose it. He ordered an injunction and a preservation order to
issue, but coupled this with a requirement that the plaintiff’s lawyer engage
another lawyer in his firm or an outside lawyer to summon the plaintiff to the
lawyer’s office without telling her the nature of the order until she arrived
there, then supervise the downloading of the Facebook material10.
1

2

For example see HSBC Bank Canada v Creative Building Maintenance Inc., 2006 CanLII
18361 (Ont SC). Similar powers may, of course, be exercised under an Anton Piller or Mareva
injunction. The leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding Anton Piller
orders, which also dealt in part with electronic information, is Celanese Canada Inc. v Murray
Demolition Corp [2006] 2 SCR 189.
Cheung (Litigation Guardian of) v Toyota Canada Inc. (2003), 29 CPC (5th) 267 (Ont SCJ),
disallowing reliance on expert reports regarding the missing evidence.
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3
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

iTrade Finance Inc. v Webworx Inc 2005 CanLII 9196 (Ont SC).
See Anwar Ali, ‘Preserving e-evidence a fifficult task: Legal community seeks rules to curb
digital shredding’, The Lawyers Weekly 32(1), May 2012.
St. Louis v Canada [1896] SCR 649; McDougall v Black & Decker Canada Inc 2008 ABCA
353. See Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, ‘The preservation and destruction of electronically stored information in Ontario,’ in Wortzman and Nickle (eds), E-Discovery in Canada,
Ch 4.
North American Road Ltd. v Hitachi Construction Machinery Company, Ltd 2005 ABQB
847 at [16].
See generally British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Spoliation of Evidence, B.C.L.I.
Report No. 34 (November 2004), available online at http://www.bcli.org/bclrg/publications/
report-spoliation-evidence.
(2000), 49 OR (3d) 699 (C.A.) at [18]–[22], leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied at (2001), 269
NR 394 (note).
Notably Zubulake v UBS Warburg, LLC 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), Zubulake v UBS
Warburg, LLC 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), Zubulake v UBS Warburg, LLC 220 F.RD.
212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and Coleman v Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct., March
1, 2005).
Sparks v Dubé, 2011 NBQB 040.

9.55 Both the Sedona Canada Guidelines and the OBA Electronic Discovery
Guidelines encourage parties to confer with each other prior to discovery
beginning, in order to attempt to resolve technical issues and agree on a scope
and format for production, among other things1. The courts have endorsed this
idea, and decisions are beginning to appear in which chambers judges
encourage2 or order3 parties to at least attempt to reach agreement on these
issues.
1
2
3

OBA Guidelines, at pp 12–16; Sedona Canada Principles, Principles 5 and 8.
Logan v Harper, 2003 CanLII 15592 (Ont SC, Master).
Sycor Tehcnology Inc. v Kiaer, 2005 CanLII 46736 (Ont SCJ); CIBC World Markets Inc. v
Genuity Capital Markets 2005 CanLII 3944 (Ont SC).

Confidentiality and legal professional privilege
9.56 Confidentiality and privilege concerns are a live matter in any civil case,
but Canadian case law is beginning to reflect some of the particular issues that
arise with electronic evidence1. Some are simple evidentiary issues, such as
whether the opening of an email from a third party’s email account amounts
to waiver of privilege2. In one case, a court applied the absolute privilege
attaching to pleadings (ie privilege as against defamation claims) and ruled that
the privilege applied to metadata in the pleadings3. In another, the court noted
that sensitive information attached to customer lists that had been ordered
produced raised concerns about the disclosure of third party information,
though these were sufficiently addressed by the implied undertaking of
confidentiality4.
1

2

3
4

See generally Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, ‘Privilege’ in Todd Burke, Kelly Friedman et
al, E-Discovery in Canada, pp 61–72.
Dublin v Montessori Jewish Day School of Toronto 2006 CanLII 7510 (Ont SC, Master);
Eizenshtein v Eizenshtein 2008 CanLII 31808 (Ont SC).
Big Pond Communications 2000 Inc. v Kennedy 2004 CanLII 18758 (Ont SC).
Animal Welfare International Inc. v W3 International Media Ltd 2011 BCSC 299.

9.57 A common problem arises from hard drives or networks which are full
of inter-mingled communications, usually via email, that might contain a mix
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of communications between solicitor and client, and discussions between the
employees of a corporate party that might contain communications protected
by litigation privilege. While the problem is not unique to the electronic
context, ‘e-discovery does, in some circumstances, involve a heightened or
special risk of inadvertent or unintended disclosure of privileged information.’1
1

OBA Guidelines, p 16.

9.58 Designing means by which disclosure can be accomplished while avoiding inadvertent release of privileged material can be challenging1. For that
matter, combing voluminous electronic files for relevant material (possibly
including drafts and metadata) can be costly and expensive. In Air Canada v
WestJet Airlines Ltd.2, the plaintiff argued that continuing with a previouslyagreed mode of electronic document review was too costly and onerous, and
requested that it be permitted to deliver documents without review for
relevance or privilege; any ‘inadvertent’ production of privileged document
was requested not to constitute waiver3. The court was ‘unmoved’4 by the
plaintiff’s cost concerns, and dismissed the motion on the basis that solicitorclient privilege should not be ‘readily sacrificed to the interests of expediency
or economics.’5
1

2
3
4
5

For a discussion in the US context, see Daniel R. Rizzolo ‘Legal privilege and the high cost of
electronic discovery in the United States: Should we be thinking like lawyers?’, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6 (2009), pp 139–152.
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont SCJ).
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont SCJ), [1].
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont SCJ), [16].
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont SCJ), [15].

9.59 What is clear is that the courts will guard the privilege of litigants
assiduously and provide significant relief where violations are found. In one
case1, the plaintiff seized the contents of a computer server belonging to the
defendants. The court found that the only effective remedy was to stay the
action. In another2, servers formerly belonging to a defendant were purchased
by a third party and came into the possession of solicitors for the plaintiff. One
of the solicitors reviewed various emails on the server, and realised that a
number of them were likely to be subject to solicitor-client privilege. The court
found the solicitors had, in fact, seen some of the privileged emails and
removed several of the solicitors from the record as a remedy. The most
famous case of this kind is probably Celanese Canada Inc. v Murray
Demolition Corp.3, where the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a major
Canadian law firm removed as solicitors of record for the plaintiffs after one
of the lawyers acting for the plaintiff disclosed privileged documents, seized
during the execution of an Anton Piller order, to the client and their experts.
1
2
3

Autosurvey Inc. v Prevost 2005 CanLII 36255 (Ont SC).
National Bank Financial Ltd. v Daniel Potter 2005 NSSC 113, aff’d 2006 NSCA 73.
[2006] 2 SCR 189.
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9.60 Canada
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Before trial
9.60 In Canada today most laws of criminal procedure are derived from the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was enacted in 1982. These
rights have constitutional status, with the result that all other laws, including
those governing police investigative techniques, must comply with Charter
standards. To fully understand today’s situation, however, it is necessary to
understand the pre-Charter rules with regard to the gathering and admission
of evidence. Prior to 1982, there were effectively no rules in Canada preventing
the use of illegally-obtained evidence. Evidence had to comply with the rules of
admissibility discussed above, but the fact that it might have been obtained
through illegal means was effectively irrelevant. As a result, there was no limit
on the techniques police could use to gather evidence, short of actions such as
beating an accused, and even then any statements would only be inadmissible
because they were not reliable.
9.61 The one pre-Charter exception to this rule concerned electronic surveillance. When legislation governing interception was introduced in 1974, it was
recognised that it posed a far greater threat to privacy than other investigative
methods of the time. The details of the scheme are reviewed below, but in
general terms the Criminal Code made the interception of private communications illegal, with exceptions for certain police investigative techniques. In
addition, a rule was added making interception evidence inadmissible unless it
was obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Code1. The pre-Charter
situation was that there were some rules governing police investigative
techniques, but if the police did not comply with those rules, any evidence
gathered was likely to be admissible none the less, except in the case of
electronic surveillance.
1

Note that this latter rule no longer exists: see para 9.97 below.

9.62 When the Charter was enacted in 1982, it created a number of individual
rights that affected police investigative techniques. The most important for this
discussion are set out in s 8, which guarantees the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, and s 24(2), which provides a potential
remedy of exclusion of evidence. Most of the rest of this part will be devoted
to s 8, while s 24(2) is discussed below at para 9.98 ff. Several significant facts
must be noted in order to understand electronic (or other) evidence-gathering
in Canada today. First, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that an
‘unreasonable’ search in s 8 means an illegal search: one not authorised by
statute or common law1. Therefore, any search for which there is no legal
authority will violate the Charter. Second, a ‘search’ is defined as anything
which impinges on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy2. The concept
of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ will be discussed at greater length below,
but this definition means that ‘search’ includes not only techniques such as
searching the pockets of an accused, but also listening in to a telephone
conversation or placing a device on a car to track its movements. Third, a
warrantless search is prima facie an unreasonable search and a Charter
violation3.
1

R v Kokesch [1990] 3 SCR 3.
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2
3

R v Wise [1992] 1 SCR 527 at 533.
Hunter v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 SCR 145.

9.63 Further, in Hunter v Southam1, one of the earliest Charter decisions,
the Court laid down rules regarding the issuing of warrants. A warrant must
be issued by a person capable of acting judicially (typically a judge or justice
of the peace), and must be issued prior to the search. The warrant must be
based on reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed
and that the search will produce evidence relating to that offence, both of
which must be proven on balance of probabilities, on oath, to the person
issuing the warrant. In sum, the Charter states that any search conducted
without a warrant prima facie violates an accused’s s 8 rights, and that
warrants should only be issued in compliance with the Hunter standards. The
standards are not absolute requirements; they are a benchmark for the
appropriate balance between the privacy interests of the individual and the
interests of the state. As either factor takes on greater or lesser importance, the
warrant requirements might become more or less stringent.
1

Hunter v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 SCR 145. In Canada, authority over property and civil rights
is given to the provinces by virtue of s 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The following is
a list of the electronic commerce acts adopted by each province or territory: Electronic
Transactions Act, RSA 2000, c. E-5.5 [Alberta]; Electronic Transactions Act, SBC 2001, c. 10
[British Columbia]; The Electronic Commerce and Information Act, SM 2000, c. 32
[Manitoba]; Electronic Transactions Act, SNB 2001, c. E-5.5 [New Brunswick]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNL 2001, c. E-5.2 [Newfoundland & Labrador]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNS 2000, c. 26 [Nova Scotia]; Electronic Commerce Act, SO 2000, c. 17
[Ontario]; Electronic Commerce Act, RSPEI 1988 c. E-4.1 [Prince Edward Island]; Electronic Commerce Act, RSY 2000, c. 66 [Yukon].

9.64 Against that background, the Court has assessed various police investigative techniques, including various electronic methods of evidence gathering.
Among the early methods reviewed were the statutory schemes governing the
use of surveillance to intercept telephone calls or other private communications (which conformed to the Charter)1 and the use of body packs surreptitiously to record conversations between a police informant and others (which
did not)2.
1
2

R v Garofoli [1990] 2 SCR 1421.
R v Duarte [1990] 1 SCR 30.

9.65 The Canadian interception law is set out in a portion of the Code entitled
‘Invasion of Privacy’. In broad terms the Code makes the electronic interception of private communications1 illegal, but then makes exceptions for some
police investigative techniques. In particular the police can apply for a warrant
– referred to as an authorisation – to intercept the private communications of
particular persons2. These requirements for authorisations not only comply
with the Hunter standards noted above; they include additional restrictions
making them less available than most other types of warrants3.
1

2

Note that the definition of ‘private communication’ includes cell telephone calls if they are
encrypted, but not otherwise: s 183.
Electronic surveillance case law in Canada is very complex, and there has been a great deal of
litigation over issues such as whether a particular person was or was not a ‘known’ person who
should have been named in the authorisation (R v Chow 2005 SCC 24), specifying the places
to which the subject ‘resorts’ (R v Thompson [1990] 2 SCR 1111), the limits involved in
intercepting pay telephones (Thompson), interception of privileged communications (R v
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9.66 Canada

3

Robillard (2000), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Que.C.A.), and many others. The statutory scheme
also contains many details not mentioned here, such as the use of interception in emergency
situations without a warrant. Those details are beyond the scope of this chapter, and the
interested reader should consult a specialist work, such as the looseleaf volume by Robert W.
Hubbard, Peter M. Brauti and Scott K. Fenton, Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance: Law and Procedure (2000).
It is important to note that despite these restrictions, electronic surveillance is – or at least has
been – quite common in Canada. A study by the Law Reform Commission of Canada found
that police in Canada applied for authorisations at 20 times the rate of police in the US: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Electronic Surveillance (1986), Ottawa: LRC, p 10.
However, that study predated many of the Charter cases discussed in this section, so it is
possible that the actual rate of use in Canada is lower now.

9.66 First, an application for an authorisation must be made to a judge: a
justice of the peace has no jurisdiction. Also, authorisations can only be used
in the investigation of certain relatively serious listed offences. These offences
are not limited to ones in the Criminal Code, but also include some offences in
the Bankruptcy Act, the Competition Act, the Export and Import Permits Act,
the Security of Information Act, and others. Limiting this investigative
technique to listed offences does restrict its use to some extent, though the list
of offences has steadily increased since the provisions were first introduced. In
addition, there are two pre-conditions to the granting of an authorisation
beyond the Hunter standards. First, the judge must be satisfied that granting
the application is in the interests of justice1. Second, ‘investigative necessity’
must be shown. This criterion is not an absolute ‘last resort’ requirement, but
does require that there be ‘practically speaking, no other reasonable alternative
method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particular criminal
inquiry’2.
1
2

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46; s 186(1)(a).
R v Araujo 2000 SCC 65, at [29].

9.67 The body pack provisions in the Invasion of Privacy section, on the other
hand, were found to violate the Charter as they stood. The notion behind the
provisions had been that as long as one of the parties to a private conversation
agreed to the recording, then the taping was by consent and no warrant was
needed. In practice, of course, this meant that police could audiotape private
communications whenever they used an informant or undercover officer,
without judicial pre-authorisation. In R v Duarte, the Court held that this
scheme fell short of the minimum standards required by Hunter, and so
violated the Charter. The court below had held that interception and recording
by consent was acceptable, on the theory that anyone talking to another
always risked that that person would repeat the conversation to the police: the
tape did not increase that risk, it merely made the record of the conversation
more reliable. The Supreme Court held that that reasoning missed the real
issue: ‘The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the
potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at the whim of the
state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words
every time we opened our mouths might be superbly equipped to fight crime,
but would be one in which privacy no longer had any meaning’1. The issue was
not the use of this technique, but the use of it by the police at their sole
discretion. As a consequence, even ‘consent’ electronic surveillance now also
310
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requires that the police obtain an authorisation from a judge.
1

R v Duarte [1990] 1 SCR 30 at [22].

9.68 Following Duarte, the next issue which arose for the Court was the use
of surreptitious video recording. The invasion of privacy provisions in
the Code did not touch on this issue at all – neither to make it illegal nor to
provide authorisations allowing police to do it. In Wong1, the police were
investigating illegal gambling conducted in a hotel room. Deciding that they
could not investigate through undercover officers, the police installed a camera
in an adjoining room and videotaped the gambling: as no warrants were
available to authorise this, they did not obtain one. The Crown argued that as
there was no statutory prohibition on video surveillance, the police were
entitled to use it at will, an approach which the Court said ‘wholly misunderstands Duarte’2. The correct conclusion, the Court held, was that in the
absence of judicial pre-authorisation, the search failed to comply with the
Hunter standard and violated the Charter. If there was no method of judicial
pre-authorisation, then the police could not use the technique at all, rather
than use it at will.
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided Wise3, in which the police had, without
a warrant, placed a tracking device on the accused’s car in order to follow the
movements of the vehicle. The Court concluded with no difficulty that this was
an unconstitutional search. Of interest was the observation by the Court that
the privacy interest at issue with regard to tracking devices was low, on the
basis that there is a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, and that the
search was less intrusive than electronic audio or video surveillance. Justice Cory for the majority expressed the view that if there were to be legislation
authorising tracking devices, it could be based on a lower standard than the
Hunter requirement of reasonable grounds.
1
2
3

R v Wong [1990] 3 SCR 36.
R v Wong [1990] 3 SCR 36 at [28].
R v Wise [1992] 1 SCR 527.

9.69 In the wake of these decisions, new warrant provisions were introduced,
which can conveniently be considered in four categories. First, the Code now
permits the police to place a tracking device on a vehicle: rather than requiring
reasonable belief to do this, the warrant is available on the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion1. Second, the Code permits the police to place a dial
number recorder (DNR) on a suspect’s telephone. This device will not intercept
communications, but will record the activity occurring on the telephone
keypad: this warrant is also available on the lower reasonable suspicion
standard2. Third, warrants for video surveillance are available: although these
provisions are not in the ‘Invasion of Privacy’ section, the video surveillance
warrants incorporate the rules governing audio surveillance, including those
limiting the offences which can be investigated in this way3.
1
2
3

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46 s 492.1.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46 s 492.2.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46 s 487.01(4), (5).

9.70 Finally, Parliament also introduced the ‘general warrant’ provisions into
the Code, a provision which is true to the letter of Duarte and Wong but
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9.71 Canada
contrary to its spirit. Those cases held that in the absence of specific
authorisation, police should not use particular investigative techniques: it was
a message of restraint. The effect of the general warrant provisions is to
remove those restraints and permit judges to authorise literally any investigative technique: the provision allows police to seek a warrant to ‘use any device
or investigative technique or procedure or do any thing’1. General warrants are
only available on criteria slightly stricter than the Hunter standards: only a
judge has jurisdiction to issue the warrant, and it must be in the interests of
justice to do so.
1

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46 s 487.01(1).

9.71 The current situation in Canada with regard to electronic investigative
techniques is that warrantless searches will generally (subject to the issue of
reasonable expectation of privacy, to be discussed below) violate the Charter,
but with a warrant anything is permissible. Three final points should be made,
however.
9.72 The first is that the array of warrant provisions creates much potential
for confusion, since some are available from justices of the peace and some are
not, some require reasonable belief while for others reasonable suspicion is
sufficient, and some impose additional requirements – the ‘interests of justice’
and investigative necessity for video and audio surveillance, and just the
‘interests of justice’ for general warrants – beyond the Hunter standards which
apply to ordinary search warrants. The result is that police and others can be
confused over which warrant to seek in which situation1. Consider a cell
telephone for example: police wishing to intercept communications through it
must proceed under a surveillance authorisation, which is only available if
investigative necessity is satisfied, but could obtain a dial number recorder
warrant on mere reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, if the objective is to
determine when an accused made telephone calls and which towers the calls
were routed through (to locate the telephone at the scene of a crime) then an
ordinary search warrant is sufficient2. Similar issues arise over email: an
ordinary search warrant is sufficient to seize and examine a computer. Indeed,
the Code specifically notes that anyone with a warrant to search a computer is
entitled to use the computer to search any data available to the system3. Search
warrants can also be used to obtain the records of an Internet Service Provider,
which might give access to email communication: but this raises a number of
questions, such as whether these messages should be seen as more akin to
private communications like those protected by the Invasion of Privacy
provisions. Similar problems occur where a webcam or VOIP communication
is made over the computer: is an ordinary search warrant the proper method
to monitor or discover that data after the fact?4
1

2
3

4

See for example R v Gerrard, [2003] CarswellOnt 421 (Ont SC) where the police obtained a
tracking warrant under s 492.1, which is available on a standard lower than the Hunter one,
but also felt they needed a higher standard general warrant to have authority to remove the
accused’s car and place the tracking device in it.
R v Cole [2006] O.J. No 1402. See also R v Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46; s 487(2.1) also explicitly permits printing out and seizing
copies of anything contained on the computer.
See the discussion in James A. Fontana and David Keeshan, The Law of Search and Seizure in
Canada (2010). Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, noting that case law concerning the use
of warrants for computers has not clearly distinguished between whether the computer is the
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Criminal proceedings 9.73
repository of information, the means by which the crime was created, or an instrument of
communication: see the discussion at pp 1163–1179.

9.73 The level of confusion caused by these provisions is demonstrated well by
the facts of a case currently before the Supreme Court of Canada, R v
Telus Communications Company1. Telus, a communications provider, received
a general warrant asking it to produce to the police all text messages sent and
received by two Telus subscribers as well as subscriber information. Complicating matters further, the general warrant in part required Telus to produce
text messages which had already been sent in the previous two weeks, but then
also required them to produce the text messages which were sent in the two
weeks after the warrant was issued. The conclusion at trial is less important
than recognising the competing arguments which are caused by the overlapping warrant provisions. In large part, the debate centred around a particular
pre-condition to general warrants: that they can only be issued if no other
warrant provision will authorise the particular investigative technique. It was
conceded by the Crown that the portion of the general warrant which dealt
with pre-existing text messages was invalid, because that information could be
obtained through an ordinary search warrant or through an alternative
referred to as a production order. Telus also argued that the subscriber
information was available through a dial number recorder warrant, and
therefore that a general warrant could not be issued for it. Finally, they argued
that the general warrant to produce to the police text messages which would
be sent in the future amounted to intercepting private communications, and
therefore should (and indeed only could) be authorised under the Code’s intercept provisions. The application judge concluded that text messages were
indeed ‘private communications’, but that because they were routinely stored
by Telus’s servers for 30 days in any case, the general warrant requiring them
to be produced was not ‘intercepting’ them. Whether the Supreme Court will
uphold this reasoning is an open question, but the point to recognise is the
confusion which the current legislative scheme creates. No one questioned that
Telus could be required to produce the text messages; the only question was
whether the legal mechanism was a general warrant, an intercept authorisation, or a series of after-the-fact search warrants.
Secondly, this legislative mix includes some very specific provisions, such as
tracking warrants, and very general ones, like general warrants. This raises the
question of which approach is best equipped to protect society and individual
liberty while keeping pace with technological change. The general warrants
provide a more flexible approach, but a provision which literally authorises
‘any thing’ must be of concern. On the other hand, more specific provisions
risk being left behind. In Wise2, for example, an important rationale for the
lower authorisation standard was that tracking devices were unsophisticated
and could not track the movement of the vehicle. With the advent of Global
Positioning System (GPS) and laptop computer mapping software, that is
exactly what tracking devices today can accomplish, but they are still
authorised on the lower standard of reasonable suspicion3.
1

2

R v Telus Communications Company, 2011 ONSC 1143, leave to appeal to SCC granted
[2011] SCCA No 325. (A residual authority in the Supreme Court Act occasionally allows
matters to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada without first going to a
provincial Court of Appeal.)
R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527.
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9.74 Canada
3

Note as well that since 1992, when DNR warrants were created, the types of activities
performed on telephone keypads have increased dramatically – entering credit card numbers,
PINs, etc. See the discussion in Steve Coughlan and Marc S. Gorbet, ‘Nothing plus nothing
equals . . . something?: A proposal for FLIR warrants on reasonable suspicion’ (2005), 23
CR (6th) 239.

9.74 Thirdly, searches for electronic information without a warrant are,
although exceptional, sometimes possible. Two recent examples should be
discussed. First, the intercept provisions in the Criminal Code generally require
an authorisation which can only be issued on fairly stringent criteria and based
on an application which could take days to draft. Recognising that there can
be urgent situations where an interception must begin before such a complete
application can be drafted, the Code also provides for emergency authorisations from a judge, which are based on a more abbreviated application and
which only last 36 hours (in essence, long enough to draft the proper
application). Even beyond that, however, the Code allows police officers to
begin to intercept without any judicial authorisation where the officers have
reasonable grounds to believe that doing so is immediately necessary to
prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm, an authorisation could
not with reasonable diligence be obtained under any other provision and that
one of the parties to the intercepted conversation is the person who will cause
the harm. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the exact law in the
Criminal Code did not comply with the Charter because it made no provision
for subsequently informing the subject of the act that the interception had
occurred. With that inclusion, however, they held that the law would be
constitutional, provided that it was understood that this power only applied
where even an emergency authorisation was not a practical option1.
1

R v Tse, 2012 SCC 16. The Supreme Court struck down the law but suspended the declaration
of invalidity for twelve months to give Parliament an opportunity to draft a new law. The
Supreme Court also made other suggestions, such as that the power should be restricted only
to police officers rather than the broader category of ‘peace officers’ and that there should be
a requirement to report to Parliament annually as to how frequently the power was used:
however, the court did not find that these requirements were constitutionally mandated.

9.75 The second example is a Bill which is before the Canadian Parliament at
the time of this writing. The Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act would allow police in some circumstances to
obtain from an ISP, without a warrant, five particular pieces of information: a
subscriber’s name, address, telephone number, email address and IP address.
Normally, only designated police officers would be permitted to request this
information, and no more than five per cent of any police force’s officers may
be so designated. However, any officer may make the request where the
urgency of the situation is such that an ordinary request for subscriber
information cannot be made, the officer believes that the information is
necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any
person or property, and the information requested concerns either the perpetrator or victim of that act. (Note that this is essentially parallel to the
warrantless intercept provision in the previous paragraph.) On the one hand,
this Bill (various versions of which have died on the order paper in the past five
to ten years) is controversial precisely because it creates a warrantless power,
which is unusual in Canadian law. On the other hand (as noted at para 9.40
ff above), there has been a tendency in Canadian courts to interpret the federal
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privacy legislation, PIPEDA, in a way which amounts to a warrantless search
power for the information covered by this Bill and more. This new power
would actually be more limiting of police powers than the approach now taken
in many courts, because the information would only be available to some
officers or in urgent circumstances1.
1

Bill C-30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012. Note as
well that this Act permits the federal Privacy Commissioner to audit the practices of the RCMP
and the Commissioner of Competition with regard to this power: see s 20(4).

9.76 There is one further issue about which more should be said: reasonable
expectation of privacy. It has already been noted that reasonable expectation
of privacy enters into the Court’s analysis of what level of protection
individuals should receive: the lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle leads
to tracking device warrants on a lower standard but, for example, the
particularly high privacy interest in one’s own DNA leads to the incorporation
of additional protections into the DNA warrant provisions of the Code1. The
concept of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ also arises at an earlier point in
the analysis, however, in a way which is worth observing in the context of
electronic evidence. A search is defined as any investigative technique which
impinges on a reasonable expectation of privacy: conversely, therefore, if an
accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy, then any investigative
technique used was not a search at all, and so was not an unreasonable
search. Courts have from time to time used this method of reasoning as a way
to avoid finding a Charter violation.
1

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, see ss 487.04–487.091 as well as R v S.A.B., [2003] 2 SCR
678 and R v Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15.

9.77 This was one of the Crown’s arguments in Wong, the video surveillance
case: since the accused had invited others into his hotel room to gamble, he had
no reasonable expectation of privacy, and so it did not matter that they had
surreptitiously videotaped him. The Court rejected the argument in that case,
and importantly noted that a ‘risk assessment’ was the wrong approach to
take. If the issue was whether privacy as a practical matter was at risk,
advancing technology would mean that individuals would only have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when sitting silently in the dark in the cellar.
The question, the Court said, was what level of privacy the individual is
entitled to expect1. Over a series of cases the Court distinguished between
territorial, informational and personal privacy, though more than one can be
relevant in a single situation – DNA testing involves both informational and
personal privacy, for example. This is still very much a developing area of law
in Canada and the interplay between the various types of privacy has not yet
been clearly worked out.
1

The argument failed as well in R v Duarte [1990] 1 SCR 30, where the Court rejected the claim
that body pack recording was no different from the risk that the informant might repeat the
conversation.

9.78 Once or twice, though, the ‘no search since no privacy’ argument has
succeeded. The Court has decided that police are entitled to obtain the power
consumption records of an accused without a warrant, since no privacy
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interest is at risk1. More recently, they have decided that police can train a
Forward Looking Infrared Scanner (FLIR) at the home of a suspect without the
need for a warrant, since there is no privacy interest in the pattern of heat
escaping from one’s house2. This latter decision created some confusion in
lower courts as to whether other investigative techniques require a warrant or
not, including a Digital Recorder Ammeter (a DRA, which is attached to the
power lines leading into a house to track the cycling pattern of electricity use)
and, somewhat surprisingly, drug sniffing dogs. Both of those factual situations
eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada3. It is worth discussing, as an
illustration of the complexity of this subject in Canadian law, their conclusion
with regard to DRAs.
1
2
3

R v Plant [1993] 3 SCR 281.
R v Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R 432.
After several years of inconsistent provincial court of appeal decisions, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided that the use of drug sniffing dogs is a search: R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18.
The court rendered a decision about the use of DRAs in R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55.

9.79 In Gomboc, the accused had a contract with a provincially-regulated
utility company to obtain electricity: it was that utility company which
attached the DRA to his power line. All nine judges of the Supreme Court took
part in the decision, subscribing to three different judgments. Four judges held
that the information gathered by a DRA did not disclose intimate details of the
lifestyle and personal choices of the individual forming part of the biographical
core data protected by the Charter’s guarantee of informational privacy, and
therefore that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information in the first place. Five judges disagreed and held that, looking only
at the type of information involved, the accused’s privacy interest was invoked.
However, of those five, three concluded that the accused lost his reasonable
expectation of privacy because of the regulatory scheme governing the utility.
Specifically, the regulations provided that the utility could disclose customer
information to a police officer for the purpose of investigating an offence
unless the disclosure was contrary to the express request of the customer.
Because it was possible to request the non-disclosure of information and the
accused had made no such request, these three judges held, what would
otherwise have been his reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished to
the extent that he could no longer claim that there had been a search. The
remaining two judges held that the reasonable consumer would not be aware
of the existence of that particular regulation and, even if aware of it, would not
anticipate that it allowed the utility to attach a DRA to gather data that would
not otherwise have been gathered. In the final result, then, a majority of five
judges held that DRA data generally attracted a reasonable expectation of
privacy, but in addition a majority of seven judges held that it did not do so in
this particular case1.
1

R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55

9.80 In any event, the current situation in Canada with regard to novel
electronic methods of investigation is (rather oddly) that they are either not
searches at all and so are completely unregulated, or are searches which can
only be authorised under the stricter-than-usual standards for general warrants.
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9.81 Warrants are normally granted on an ex parte basis1, which means that
it will not usually be until trial that the accused has an opportunity to challenge
the basis upon which the warrant or intercept authorisation was issued2. If it
is found that the warrant ought not to have been issued, that will render
whatever search was made a warrantless one which, as noted above, makes it
prima facie an unreasonable search violating s 8 of the Charter and potentially
entitling the accused to a remedy.
1

2

The SCC noted in R v SAB [2003] 2 SCR 678, 2003 SCC 60, dealing with DNA warrants, that
judges have the discretion to conduct an inter partes hearing in an application for such a
warrant, but no warrant provisions in Canada require inter partes hearings.
In principle it might be open to seek a review before a judge other than the trial judge, but the
Supreme Court has said the preferred course is to make the challenge at trial: see R v Garofoli
[1990] 2 SCR 1421.

9.82 The standard on review is whether there was any basis upon which the
authorising judge could have granted the warrant: the reviewing judge does
not substitute his or her discretion on the question of whether the warrant
should have been issued. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for an accused to
show fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the police in obtaining the
warrant or authorisation in order to have the warrant quashed. If fraud or
misrepresentation is shown, however, that material is excised and the question
is whether the remaining material provided a basis to issue the warrant1. On
the other hand, where errors in the affidavit are minor technical ones made in
good faith – but only then – the affiant is permitted to ‘amplify’ the affidavit
in cross-examination: that is, the errors can be corrected and the new
information can be relied upon in the review2. The Court has held that this is
the appropriate balance between requiring pre-authorisation, but not permitting form to triumph over substance. This rule was handed down in the
particular context of electronic surveillance, but it has been taken to apply to
warrant provisions generally, and therefore should apply to any other potentially electronic searches, such as DNRs, tracking devices or general warrants,
and indeed to ordinary search warrants.
1
2

R v Garofoli [1990] 2 SCR 1421.
R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65.

9.83 In challenging an intercept authorisation, an accused does not have an
automatic right to cross-examine the affiant: rather, leave to cross-examine
must be obtained from the trial judge. The trial judge has discretion, but
should allow cross-examination when it is necessary to enable the accused to
make full answer and defence. In particular, the accused must show a
reasonable likelihood that cross-examination will tend to discredit the existence of one of the preconditions to the authorisation. When crossexamination is permitted, it is limited to questions directed to establish that
there was no basis for granting the authorisation1.
1

R v Garofoli [1990] 2 SCR 1421, and subsequently re-affirmed in R v Pires; R v Lising, 2005
SCC 66.

9.84 To conclude this discussion of pre-trial procedures in criminal matters, it
is worth noting that the law in Canada is still finding its feet when it comes to
searches of electronic data storage devices: computers, cell telephones, even
digital cameras. A number of related issues having to do with the extent to
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which electronic data storage devices can be searched are currently being
litigated. Courts in Canada have recognised that special considerations arise in
these cases. A number of related issues having to do with the extent to which
electronic data storage devices can be searched have been litigated. If a broad
theme has emerged, it is that courts are trying to interpret existing laws in a
way that reflects the special considerations which arise with these emerging
issues.
For example, Canadian law recognises a warrantless power of ‘search incident
to arrest’ which allows police to search an accused and in some circumstances
his or her surroundings for evidence relating to the reason for the arrest. An
increasingly common situation is for an arrestee to be carrying a cell telephone,
and therefore the question has arisen as to the extent to which police are
allowed to rely on the warrantless search incident to arrest power to examine
its contents. There is as yet no leading case, but the prevailing view seems to
be that police have a limited power to examine the device if that is truly
incident to the arrest, but do not have free rein to examine its contents in their
entirety1.
1

See, for example, R v Manley, 2011 ONCA 128, where police were entitled to look at the
contents of a cell telephone sufficiently to determine whether it belonged to the accused,
because he was arrested on robbery charges and was known to have stolen cell telephones;
they were not, however, entitled to examine it beyond what was required to determine
ownership. On the other hand, see R v Caron 2011 BCCA 56, 84 CR (6th) 323, where a police
officer who arrested the accused for speeding had no right to scroll through the pictures on the
digital camera he found in the glove compartment. Other cases dealing with searches of cell
telephones incident to arrest (or incident to investigative detention, a somewhat more limited
power) include: R v Cater, 2012 NSPC 2; R v D’Annunzio, [2010] O.J. No. 4333; R v Fearon,
2010 ONCJ 645; R v Hiscoe, 2011 NSPC 84; R v Howell, 2011 NSSC 284; R v Hull, 2011
ONSC 3139; R v Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826; and R v Zahrebelny, 2010 NSPC 91. See also the
discussion in William MacKinnon, ‘Section 8 meets the iPhone: Searching cell phones incident
to arrest’, (2011) 84 CR (6th) 237; or James Brock, ‘Reconciling reasonable expectations of
privacy and modern technology: U.S. v. Canadian approaches’, (2011) 83 CR (6th) 28.

9.85 Similarly, the legitimate purpose of the search has operated as the
controlling factor in cases dealing with searches of a computer. In Jones, the
police had seized the accused’s computer and had a warrant to search it for
evidence of fraud: in the course of doing so they chanced across images which
in Canadian law would be classified as ‘child pornography’. The Court held
that the police were not entitled then to search the computer for more child
pornography unless they first obtained a new warrant1. Similarly, in Vu the
police had a warrant to search a house in which they suspected marijuana was
being grown, and in that house they found two computers and a cell telephone.
The Crown argued that the police were entitled to search the computers and
cell telephone in their entirety since they were within the house: the accused
argued that no warrant to search a building gave the power to search a
computer contained therein unless the warrant specifically said so. In fact, the
court adopted a middle position, looking to the terms of the warrant. In the
particular case, the warrant authorised the police to search for documents
identifying the owner or occupier of the building: that should be taken to
include electronic documents, and so some search of the computer was
permitted. However, that search had to be limited to locations on it likely to
produce identifying documents2.
1

R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632
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2

R v Vu, 2011 BCCA 536. In fact, one computer was logged in to the accused’s Facebook page,
and the police were entitled therefore to look at that page. Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada has been granted: R v Vu, [2012] SCCA No 94.

9.86 On the other hand, Canadian courts have also found the plain view
doctrine to apply. In Cole, for example, a school board technician opened a
folder on a teacher’s laptop while looking for a virus, which he was entitled to
do: when he opened the folder, the thumbnail photographs of a nude female
student were, the court held, in plain view, and so there was no violation of the
accused’s right in their discovery1. Similarly, in Manley, while legitimately
searching a cell telephone for information which would identify the accused,
the police officer observed a photograph of the accused holding a firearm:
because it was found during a lawful search, the photograph was admissible.
On the other hand, in Jones, although thumbnail images of child pornography
were in plain view as the officer was examining a computer for other reasons,
the video files of child pornography were not in plain view2.
1

2

R v Cole, 2011 ONCA 218. Cole has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada: R
v Cole, [2011] SCCA No 278.
R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632.

Disclosure
9.87 As in many other areas of the criminal law, the rules about disclosure of
evidence are governed by the Charter. The Crown has an obligation to disclose
to an accused all relevant evidence in its hands, whether the Crown intends to
use the evidence or not: this obligation arises from the right of the accused to
a fair trial, which is contained within s 7 of the Charter. This rule supersedes
any individual rules which might otherwise apply to electronic evidence. The
intercept provisions in the Code, for example, were initially drafted to provide
that all materials relied upon to grant an authorisation would be sealed and
would not normally be given to the accused: now, the opposite is true and the
ordinary rule for intercepts is the same Charter presumption of full disclosure
that applies to all other evidence1.
1

See R v Garofoli [1990] 2 SCR 1421; R v Durette [1994] 1 SCR 469; and s 187 of the
Criminal Code RSC 1985, c. C-46.

9.88 None the less, the duty to disclose does not extend to privileged material,
and in the case of warrants, the police might have relied upon information
obtained from confidential informants. Informer privilege is recognised in
Canadian law, and so the materials disclosed to the accused are first edited by
the prosecutor to remove information which might identify a confidential
informant. The Code legislates this rule for intercepts, as well as allowing
editing to protect ongoing investigations, undercover officers or techniques,
and innocent persons1. If too much information is edited from the supporting
material, however, the accused might be entitled to a remedy based on a breach
of the right to disclosure. This is independent of the question of reviewing a
warrant discussed below, and the remedy might be granted even if the material
disclosed was sufficient to justify the issuance of the authorisation2.
1

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, s 187(4).
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2

R v Durette [1994] 1 SCR 469.

9.89 The disclosure obligation is also limited to relevant material. Accordingly, an accused charged with an offence is not entitled to know whether he
or she has been subject to interception other than that relating to the particular
offence charged1.
1

R v Chaplin [1995] 1 SCR 727.

9.90 There are also some special rules regarding electronic evidence. First, by
statute, there might be an obligation to disclose some methods of investigation
even if no charges have been laid. Section 196 of the Code requires that the
person whose communications were intercepted must be notified of the
interception at most 90 days after the authorisation expires, though this period
can be extended where the investigation is continuing, by periods of up to three
years1. A similar rule applies in the case of general warrants2, though
somewhat surprisingly there is no similar rule for DNR or tracking warrants.
1
2

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, s 196.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, s 487.01(5.1).

9.91 There can also be technical issues around disclosure of electronic
evidence. In R. v Cassidy1, for example, the accused was charged with
possession of child pornography and the police had seized his computer hard
drives. They examined the hard drives with two software programs, one of
which was available only to the police, the other of which was commercially
available but cost (including training) CN$4,500.00. In that particular case the
court concluded that the proper method of disclosure was to provide the
accused with a copy of the hard drive and allow the accused’s expert to use the
programs in private at the police station. They left open the possibility that on
some facts disclosure might require providing the accused with the software
and training.
1

(2004), 182 CCC (3d) 294 (Ont CA).

9.92 Exactly what result will flow if the Crown fails to disclose evidence
which it should is a complex question in Canadian law, since the issue depends
on what Charter remedy is appropriate and just in the circumstances. If the
non-disclosure is discovered at a pre-trial stage, the only remedy is likely to be
an order for disclosure. Even mid-trial, in most cases the remedy is only likely
to be an adjournment accompanied by an order for disclosure1. If the
non-disclosure does not come to light until after the trial, then an appeal court
might do anything from deciding that a conviction must be overturned and a
stay of any further proceedings ordered, to deciding that no remedy at all is
necessary2.
1
2

R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38.
The rules around Charter remedies for non-disclosure are quite complex and even inconsistent
in some ways, even over the fundamental question of whether there is an independent right to
disclosure or whether it is just an aspect of the right to a fair trial. The most important cases
have not concerned electronic evidence, but since those cases fall within the general regime of
Charter violations and Charter remedies, the principles apply in that context. More information concerning remedies for non-disclosure can be found in Don Stuart, Charter Justice in
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Canadian Criminal Law (5th edn, 2010) under ‘Right to a fair trial (right to make full answer
and defence)’.

Destruction of evidence
9.93 The rules around ‘lost evidence’ have evolved in a slightly unusual
fashion. Although they now frequently arise in the context of electronic
evidence, such as audiotaped interviews or surveillance footage, they were first
articulated in a case dealing with notes which had been destroyed. Carosella
dealt with a historical sexual assault prosecution1. The complainant in the case
had visited a sexual assault crisis centre seeking advice on how to go about
complaining of an assault which had taken place nearly 30 years previously. A
counsellor at the centre interviewed the complainant, though in accordance
with the centre’s policy she took few notes. Further, in accordance with the
centre’s policies, those notes were destroyed because of the possibility that they
might later be subpoenaed. As a result, when the accused did eventually seek
production of those records, the file which the centre produced no longer
contained any record of the interview with the complainant.
1

R v Carosella [1997] 1 SCR 80.

9.94 The accused objected to this lack of disclosure1. The Supreme Court of
Canada agreed with the accused and found that there was a violation of the
accused’s right to disclosure. In addition – and somewhat extraordinarily –
the Court concluded that the only remedy for that non-disclosure was to stay
proceedings against the accused. This decision was difficult to reconcile with
the court’s previous cases on both the law of disclosure and on the issue of
when a stay of proceedings was available as a remedy. Many commentators
suggest that the Court’s real concern in the case was to send a message to
sexual assault crisis centres, and really had little to do with issues of disclosure.
1

Canadian law distinguishes between ‘disclosure’, which concerns records in the hands of the
Crown, and ‘production’, which concerns records in the hands of a third party. Generally
speaking a higher standard is set for production, so that the accused has a higher burden to
show that he or she is entitled to third party records. In addition, there are both common law
rules for production (R v O’Connor [1995] 4 SCR 411) and a statutory scheme which makes
the test for production somewhat stricter in the case of confidential records sought in
connection with prosecutions for sexual offences (see ss 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code).
The distinction between disclosure and production is not entirely clear, and Carosella is one
of the cases responsible for muddying that water. Fortunately, a sophisticated understanding
of the distinction and the different sets of rules is not necessary to understand the rules around
lost evidence.

9.95 On the face of it, Carosella seemed to create a draconian rule that cases
had to be stayed when evidence which ought to have been disclosed was no
longer available. In fact the Court moved quickly to demonstrate that this was
not the rule. Only a few months after Carosella, the Court handed down its
decision in La1. In that case a peace officer had found a thirteen-year-old
runaway they had been looking for and had interviewed her about the driver
of the car in which she was found. The driver was known to the police to be
a pimp, and in fact was later charged with sexual assault against the girl. The
officer who had interviewed the girl testified that she had told a few lies on the
tape. However, by the time the accused was charged and obtained disclosure,
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the tape recording itself could no longer be found and so was not given to the
accused. He applied, on the basis of Carosella, for a remedy. The Court found
that he was not entitled to a remedy, and indeed that there had been no breach
of his rights in the first place. The tape was relevant, they acknowledged, and
the accused did have the right to disclosure of it. The Court carried on to find,
however, that the Crown could not disclose what it did not have. The Crown
ought to preserve relevant evidence. Where it could not do so, though, it would
not automatically mean that the right to disclosure had not been satisfied. They
held that where ‘the evidence has not been destroyed or lost owing to
unacceptable negligence, the duty to disclose has not been breached’2.
1
2

R v La [1997] 2 SCR 680.
R v La [1997] 2 SCR 680 at [20].

9.96 This rule applies, obviously, beyond issues of electronic evidence, but it
has been specifically applied in that context. In Mymryk, for example, the
accused was charged with assaulting a police officer after he threw his shoe
either ‘at’ or ‘to’ the officer, depending on whose testimony one accepted1. The
offence occurred at the police station as the accused was being booked and was
being required to remove his shoelaces: the entire incident would have been
captured on a security camera. Those tapes were not generally prepared for
evidence-gathering purposes, and so they were re-used after six months. In
Mymrik, defence counsel only became aware of the existence of the tape and
requested disclosure of it two days after it had been erased. The trial judge
found that the Crown’s explanation for the loss was not acceptable and
amounted to negligence. It ought to have occurred to the police or the Crown
that this particular tape was of unusual significance, and so it ought not to
have simply been treated in accordance with the general policy of re-use.
Failing to pay attention to this issues revealed ‘indifference or ignorance’ of the
Crown’s duty to preserve evidence, as well as a failure to look beyond the
needs of the prosecution to the broader issue of potential relevance to the
defence.2 Similarly, see Abukar, where the accused claimed that a surveillance
video at a casino would show that he could not have been at the scene of the
crime, but the police did not investigate this alibi until after the casino had
routinely recorded over the tapes in question3.
1
2

3

R v Mymrik, (2004), 26 CR (6th) 83 (Que SC).
R v Mymrik, (2004), 26 CR (6th) 83 (Que SC) at [40]. For similar facts and result see R v
Banford, 2010 SKPC 110. To similar effect, see R v Akinchets, 2011 SKPC 88 dealing with the
failure to preserve a recorded telephone complaint to the police about the accused.
R v Abukar, 2009 ABPC 136

Trial
9.97 As noted above, the pre-Charter situation in Canada essentially allowed
no exclusion of evidence based on the fact that it had been illegally obtained.
The only exception to that rule was in the case of evidence gathered through
the electronic surveillance provisions in the Code: in that case, if the police had
not complied with the law for interception, the evidence was automatically
excluded. Since the Charter, both of those situations have changed. The
provision in the Code, which previously provided for the inadmissibility of
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illegally obtained interception evidence, was repealed in 1993. As a result, the
possible exclusion of all illegally-obtained evidence is now a Charter question1.
1

The Court suggested in R v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 that there is some possibility of excluding
evidence other than under s 24(2), and that this power predated the Charter. The power has
been little in evidence prior to or since the Charter. There is also theoretically the ability to
exclude under s 24(1) of the Charter, though that remedy is infrequent: see for example R v
Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38.

9.98 When the Charter was introduced, it was recognised that if the rights
guaranteed within it were to have real meaning, then remedies for breach of
those rights had to be available. Although it was agreed that those remedies
needed to include the exclusion of evidence, it was also seen as important that
automatic exclusion of evidence should not follow from a breach of the
Charter. Accordingly, a special provision was incorporated in addition to the
more general remedy provision discussed at para 9.87 ff above. Section 24(2)
of the Charter provides for exclusion of evidence gathered in violation of a
Charter right where ‘the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute’. The onus is on the applicant to show
that the evidence should be excluded.
Over a number of years, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed a test for
exclusion of evidence under s 24(2). In fact, this has been an area the Court has
found quite bedevilling, with the result that there has been a constant evolution
in the test. The test was once referred to as the Collins test1, then later as the
Stillman test2; with a significant reworking of the test in 2009, it has now come
to be known as the Grant test3.
1
2
3

R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265.
R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607.
R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32.

9.99 The central point to understand about the test for exclusion of evidence
is that its focus is not on deterring police conduct, nor even primarily on
remedying the accused’s situation1. Rather, the focus is on the reputation of the
justice system: in essence, has there been conduct from which the courts should
disassociate themselves? This decision might have an incidental deterrent
effect, but that is not its purpose. The analysis is prospective, aimed at
preventing further harm to the reputation to the justice system, beyond that
already suffered from a Charter right having been breached.
The Court has said, in Grant, that three sets of factors should be taken into
account in deciding the question of exclusion. No one set of factors is
controlling, and all have to be balanced against one another. The three
considerations are:
‘(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the
message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the impact of the
breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused (admission may send the
message that individual rights count for little), and (3) society’s interest in the
adjudication of the case on its merits’2
1

R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at [70]: ‘Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or
providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is
on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of the justice
system.’
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2

R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at [71].

9.100 The first set of factors involves considering how severe the breach of
Charter rights has been. A wilful and deliberate violation of rights is to be
regarded more seriously than an inadvertent one, or one made in a situation of
urgency. This factor is taking on some significance as confusion over the exact
limits of police powers to search electronic storage devices is being worked out:
even courts which are finding that police have unlawfully searched a cell
telephone, computer or memory stick are sometimes finding that the evidence
should not be excluded because it was understandable that the police did not
know the limits of their authority1. The second set of factors looks more to the
interest of the accused which has been compromised. Most simply, a body
cavity search will be far more intrusive than a simple frisk, and so it would be
easier to forgive the latter rather than the former. The Supreme Court of
Canada has observed that a particularly strong privacy interest can be invoked
in these cases:
‘it is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than the search of
one’s home and personal computer. Computers often contain our most intimate
correspondence. They contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal
situations. They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording
in the browsing history and cache files the information we seek out and read, watch,
or listen to on the Internet.’2

The third set of factors acknowledges that society has an interest in the guilty
being convicted, which must also be considered in taking into account the
system’s reputation. Generally speaking, the more reliable the evidence and the
greater its importance to the Crown’s case, the less likely it is to be excluded:
that is, there must be a stronger reason to do so based on the earlier factors.
The Court seems to have excluded the seriousness of the offence from playing
a significant role in the analysis: both the accused and society have more ‘on
the line’ when a serious offence has been charged, so this factor alone does not
sway the analysis to one side or the other.
1

2

See, for example, R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 or R v Tuduce, 2011 ONSC 2749; to the
opposite effect, see R v Caron, 2011 BCCA 56.
R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at [105]. To similar effect, see R v Manley, 2011 ONCA 128 at [39]:
‘Cell phones and other similar handheld communication devices in common use have the
capacity to store vast amounts of highly sensitive personal, private and confidential
information – all manner of private voice, text and e-mail communications, detailed
personal contact lists, agendas, diaries and personal photographs. An open-ended power to
search without a warrant all the stored data in any cell phone found in the possession of any
arrested person clearly raises the spectre of a serious and significant invasion of the
Charter-protected privacy interests of arrested persons.’

9.101 It is too early to say whether any patterns have emerged with regard to
electronic evidence issues and this newly-formulated test. However, the factors
used in the Grant test are not entirely new, having been used in other ways in
previous iterations of the s 24(2) analysis, and so some observations can be
made.
9.102 The use of evidence which conscripts the accused against him or herself
– breathalysers, for example – has been seen in the past as almost certain to
render a trial unfair and therefore to render evidence subject to exclusion. In
large measure this is because Canadian law has seen the right to silence as
particularly important. ‘Trial fairness’ itself is no longer directly a criterion,
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but similar considerations are likely to be seen as having a significant effect on
an accused’s Charter-protected interests. That will militate against admitting
such evidence if it has been illegally obtained. This will only follow, however,
where electronic evidence-gathering techniques produce the evidence, as
opposed to turning up previously existing evidence. It has also been taken in
the past to require state involvement in the creation of the evidence. Accordingly, whether interception evidence (for example) impinges on this interest is
likely to depend on whether a state actor is involved in the taped conversation,
or whether it is simply an interception of a conversation between the accused
and another1.
1

See, for example, the discussion in R v Mooring, 2003 BCCA 199. See also R v Stanton,
2010 BCCA 208, relying on Mooring.

9.103 However, it will also be relevant to consider what it is that has led to the
illegality in obtaining the evidence. If police act on an interception authorisation which they believed to be lawful but which is later found to have been
invalidly issued, the evidence might well not be excluded, on the basis that the
police relied on the authorisation in good faith1. Similarly, the impact on
Charter-protected interests will vary with the nature of the investigative
technique used. Privacy has traditionally been seen as a particularly significant
interest, and there is no reason that the reformulation of the s 24(2) test in
Grant should change that. However, privacy is not uniform and so, for
example, individuals are seen to have a particularly high degree of privacy in
their homes, and a relatively lower one in their vehicles. Investigative
techniques which intrude illegally on the home are therefore more likely to
result in exclusion, while those which only intrude on privacy in a vehicle are
less likely to result in exclusion2.
1
2

See for example, R v Fliss, 2002 SCC 16.
See for example, R v Wise [1992] 1 SCR 527, in which the police unlawfully attached a
tracking device to the accused’s car, but where the Court concluded that the illegally obtained
evidence should not be excluded.
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